ARTAK SHAKARYAN

INTRODUCTION
Armenian-Turkish relations are considered one of the most problematic issues the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to deal with. Moreover, it is one of the most crucial problems of the newly independent Republic of Armenia.
Due to its deep nature, the problem of Armenian-Turkish relations is interwoven in almost all other issues and relations: the Karabakh conflict; economic stability; the relations of Armenia with Russia, USA, EU (France in particular), Middle East (Syria and Israel in particular), Georgia, Iran and Azerbaijan. That is why the problem needs to be analyzed by a vast number of scholars, and many alternatives should be presented to the society and decision-makers.
This current study is an attempt to understand the unseen or unspoken factors of the issue. The study is an analysis of the two major parties of the issue, their psychology, the inner motivations, the zones of possible agreement. Here, I conclude that Armenia and Turkey have a very narrow zone of possible agreement and no political issue should be publicly discussed yet. Two societies need time to warm up their social and economic relations and that will help to raise the level of trust. The lack of mutual trust is the key factor in the relations between Armenia and Turkey, so future steps must focus in that direction.

I. RELATIONSHIP-BUILDING

The milestones in the history and recent developments
Armenian-Turkish relations are dated back to the Middle Ages when the first Turkic nomadic tribes settled in the Middle East and the Caucasus. With the rise of the Ottoman Empire, the western part of Armenia passed under the control of the Sublime Porte, and Armenians became one of the largest Christian minorities within the Empire.
With the industrialization of the Empire, Armenians acquired many important positions and were called “Millet-i sadika” (“the loyal nation”). The rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, the threat of advancement of Russians in WWI on the Caucasian borders and other deeper motives that are not the subject of this paper resulted in the events of 1915-1923 years that Armenians call Genocide and Turks call reciprocal massacres.
Since those times, the Armenian-Turkish relations are anchored in 1915. All other states try to use that situation in favor of own interests, playing that card when they want to take something from Yerevan or Ankara.
The beginning of modern Armenian-Turkish relations was overshadowed also by Karabakh conflict. Though on December 16, 1991 the Government of Turkey officially recognized the independence of the Republic of Armenia, only 6 months later Turkey declared its readiness to be engaged in the Karabakh conflict as a third conflicting party which was stopped by the threat of Russians to be involved in the conflict as well1. However, each advance of Armenian part got harsh response from Ankara side. Finally this resulted in the decision of the Turkish Government to close Armenian-Turkish border as a reaction to the activities of Armenian army in the Karvachar/Kelbadjar region in April 19932. “On April 3, 1993, the government announces its decision to put an end to the wheat delivery which Turkey makes towards Armenia and not to let anymore any kind of aid destined for Armenia, over the Turkish territory”3.
The border opening is considered a precondition for development of bilateral relations. Being a major power in the region, Ankara tries to be assertive in the dialogue, and the Turkish part is sure that the closed border and the blockade of Armenia will force Yerevan to accept the Turkish preconditions. Turkish side tries to use the issue of opening the border in every negotiation with Yerevan in order to get a compromise from the Armenian part.
These preconditions give perfect outline of the main issues in Armenian-Turkish relations: renunciation from the policy of recognition of Armenian Genocide, recognition of territorial integrity of Turkey, and unilateral compromises in the Karabakh conflict.
The Armenian part seemingly did some steps forward, such as announcing its refusal from the policy of internalization of the genocide issue (president L.Ter-Petrosyan). Getting no positive response the next president R.Kocharyan had to step back in order to receive nationwide approval for the first years of his presidency and support of nationalistic parties. But even though the policy of recognition of Armenian Genocide is believed to be one of the basic points on the political agenda of Yerevan, Armenian officials has repeatedly declared that Armenia is open to dialogue with Turkey and makes no precondition for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Armenian authorities have also declared that Yerevan recognizes the territorial integrity of Turkey and the Kars agreement of 1921, but still refuses to take a notion on Western Armenia (i.e. eastern part of Turkey) from its Constitution which is the main concern of Turkey.
United States have contributed much to the efforts of second track (or public) diplomacy. The first effort took place in 1997 with the establishment of Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council4. In 1997, during the Summit of the Head of States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in Istanbul, institutionalization of the economic relations between Turkey and Armenia was put on the agenda. A group of Turkish and Armenian businessmen, mostly working in the transport and logistics sector and having collaborated for the delivery of American humanitarian aid to Armenia, proposed forming a Turkish-Armenian Business Council. The second effort was the formation of the reconciliation commission, or TARC, that announced in 2001 following meetings held under the auspices of the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna. The group comprised four Armenian and six Turkish representatives. None of the members has any direct link to either the Armenian or Turkish governments, yet most have extensive political connections5. The initiator and coordinator was US diplomat Davis Philips. The Commission did not have long life. It prepared several advice packages on the issue of normalization of the bilateral relations, and the content of those is still secret6.
US Government and USAID back Eurasia Foundation and some other organizations in Armenia in giving large amounts of grant awards to non-governmental organizations for organizing second-track diplomacy initiatives such as exchanges of journalists and businessmen, conferences on the issues of the opening of the border, etc7.
Officials note that in practice Turkey deals with Armenia through its Tbilisi embassy8; and various sources from time to time declare that Armenian and Turkish representatives are holding secret talks. This information is confirmed both by Armenian and Turkish authorities9. The meetings of the MFA representatives generally try to prepare the common ground for the upcoming meetings of the foreign ministers or other state officials.
Back in 2005, as the 90th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide approached, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan came up with an initiative in a letter to Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, proposing creation of a joint commission to address the history. In response, Mr. Kocharyan called on Turkey to establish diplomatic relations and open its border with Armenia without preconditions, and to form an intergovernmental commission to address all bilateral concerns10.
The public diplomacy methods used by Turkish side to not limit with the above mentioned ones. The Church of the Holy Cross on Akhtamar Island in Lake Van was opened in Turkey in March 2007. The opening ceremony was attended by the Armenian delegation headed by RA Deputy Minister of Culture and Youth Affairs Gagik Gyurjyan. Also present was the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople Mesrop Archbishop Mutafyan. From the Turkish side the ceremony was attended by Culture Minister Atilla Koch11. It is worth to mention that though the church was opened as a museum still it constitutes an important PR message to Armenia and the international community that Turkey has a lot of place to make little compromises if Armenia is willing to give up something as well.

The closed borders in the age of globalization: profitable trade detours the closed borders like a river detour obstacles to reach to the sea
The pretext for the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border was Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and the situation during the Karabakh war. It was a symbolic act to show Baku that newly independent Azerbaijan should chose Turkey as the senior partner instead of Russia or any other country. So far, the reluctance of Ankara to open the border can be also explained by political aspects of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. Baku will regard the opening of the border as the most unfriendly act Ankara can do.
However, closed borders do not mean that there are no Turkish-Armenian relations and communications at all. The exchanges and the contacts between Turkey and Armenia are executed via different ways of communication. The air corridor which was opened in 1996 connects Istanbul and Yerevan. Road transport passes across a third country: merchandises and passengers have to traverse either Iranian or Georgian territory12.
Despite the closure of the border, according to the data collected by the American Embassy in Yerevan; Turkey is the seventh commercial partner of Armenia. There is an established flow of exchanges between Armenia and Turkey. Turkish authorities evaluate it between 70 and 150 millions of dollars per year while the estimations of the Armenian authorities give an amount increasing to 250 million per year13. The wide range of estimations is due the fact that exportation to Armenia is not allowed and the final destination of the Turkish goods going to Armenia is mentioned to be Georgia and sometimes Russia14.
The professionals of the transport and logistics sector declare that, in case the Turkish-Armenian border opens, the Georgian transit traffic towards Armenia may be forsaken, in a month, for the Turkish ports along the Black Sea as in case of the utilization of the Turkish ports along the Black Sea, road transport costs might be diminished by 25%. The economies made may reach 1.9 millions of dollars, or, if a quarter of the traffic continues to be done through the port of Poti, 1.4 millions of dollars. In this case, Georgia’s loss in transit revenues would be 5.6 and 7.4 millions of dollars; which would equal to a diminution by 16-20% of the excessive gains obtained from the cargo services, in the balance of payments15.
Turkish railroad system is very necessary for Armenia as an alternative to Georgian way. Currently more than 90% of Armenian exports go through Georgian ports. More than 1000 goods wagon a month is coming to Armenia from Batumi (Georgia).
Mediterranean ports of Turkey are of much interest for Armenia because Black Sea ports do not give opportunity to use oceanic container ships that are much cheaper. And more, having Armenian using the alternative Turkish way, Georgia will be forced to decrease passage fees16.
The regional market includes Georgia, Azerbaijan, north-western Iran and eastern and south-eastern Turkey17: a market with 50 millions of consumers, which represents a GDP of 10 billions of dollars. In terms of GDP, eastern and south-eastern Turkey and north-western Iran represent one third of the regional market.
Closed borders cut both ways
The closure of the border hinders not only the development of Armenia but also Turkey. It is comprehended in Turkey not only by the population residing near the border but also by businessmen. The Association of Industrialists and Businessmen in Turkey, TÜSİAD, states that it is in favor of the development of economic and commercial relations with Turkey. TÜSİAD tries to promote the relations with the Armenian private sector. On the other hand, the Unions of Exporters, official structures depending on the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, clearly criticize the politics regarding Armenia. The closure of the border, which means an embargo decision, does not have a political efficiency, according to the authorities of the Unions of Exporters in the visited regions. This measure has only limited the exportation capacities of small and medium sized enterprises implanted in the regions distant from the economic center18.
The relations with the region and the distance from the center determine the relation with the border. The approach developed at the national level usually contradicts the perception of the population residing in the border regions. The opening of the border and the establishment of direct commercial relations with Armenia are the priorities for the cities of Kars, Iğdır and Trabzon19.
This is the main card that Armenia can play: the opening of Armenian-Turkish border would accelerate the development of eastern ils of Turkey. The development indicators of these regions significantly differ from the medium indicators along Turkey. Hence, if in 2002 GDP per capita in Armenia was $ 2,950, and while the same indicator in Turkey was about $ 6,000, in eastern regions of Turkey the indicator was 5 times lower than that in Turkey in general (about $ 1,200)20. This means that the eastern regions of Turkey are far less developed than Armenia and they have actually a lot to gain from the open border. Therefore, Ankara can develop those regions even without additional investments. During past years Turkey has invested great amount of money and issued special regional tax advantages for the development of these regions but without any tangible result: having an impasse with the closed border makes no meaning for building factories or operating large companies.
Moreover, domestic migration rates are very high in these eastern regions. High-qualified workers and university graduates tend to migrate to the western regions and in case of normal relations many workplaces will be opened and also Armenia can help the eastern parts of Turkey with qualified professionals it needs much21.
Re-opening of Armenian-Turkish border is of much importance for railroad connection between Turkey and Central Asian Turkic countries. This has both economic and politic meaning for Ankara. Trade develops very slowly with TIR Lorries and the penetration of Turkish business cannot compete with Russian capital flows. However, instead of using Kars (Turkey) - Gyumri (Armenia) railroad, Ankara tries to exert pressure on Armenia by building Kars – Akhalkalaki (Georgia) very expensive railroad to bypass Armenia.

II. PARTIES

The main parties in this conflict are Turkey and Armenia. There are both nationalistic and liberal factions in both countries. The army is very powerful in both countries, especially in Turkey.
All the regional countries are using Turkish-Armenian confrontation for their own interests, so they would likely hinder any reconciliation process.
• Georgia and Iran gain much from Armenia using traverse routs to Turkey or Turkey detouring Armenia via these countries. Currently more than 90% of Armenian exports go through Georgian ports.
• Azerbaijan believes that harsh blockade of Armenia hinders its economic development that will help Baku to have a revanche solving the Karabakh issue with hard power.

Major global powers Russia, EU and USA have different approaches to the problem.
 Russia maintains its strategic relations with Armenia and develops economic relations with Turkey. Russia is unwilling for the possible reconciliation as open border with Turkey would make Armenia more independent and open a way to the Western markets a factor that could push Armenia towards Western orientation.
 EU uses Turkish-Armenian problem as a playing card against Ankara. The reconciliation would make that stick softer. Although European Union presses Turkey for the recognition of Armenian Genocide and the opening of the borders, it does so more because of its reluctance to accept Ankara to European family.
 USA realizes that closed borders and unfriendly Turkey are the main factors of Armenia’s Russian orientation. That is why Washington puts much effort in the bilateral talks and reconciliation steps.
Armenian Diaspora constitutes a separate party. Armenian Diaspora is one of the ardent opponents of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation if that settlement would imply renunciation from the politics of recognition of the Armenian genocide.

III. ISSUES

The main issue is the absence of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, Turkish preconditions for the opening of the closed border and the bitter of the Armenian genocide.
Armenia believes that Turkey:
1. committed the Genocide;
2. is reluctant to recognize that;
3. helps Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict;
4. is very hostile towards Armenia;
5. will use every opportunity to endanger Armenia’s security.

Turkey believes that Armenia:
1. slanders Turkey about the “so-called” Genocide;
2. will try to endanger the territorial integrity of Turkey if there is an opportunity (‘sevrophobia’);
3. uses the politics of recognition to demand financial compensation from Turkey;
4. has unjustly occupied the territory of “brother-country” Azerbaijan.
For Armenia the main issue is the guarantee of security from Turkey, and for Turkey the main issue is the territorial integrity of the state.

IV. POSITIONS

The key issue between two parties is the fact of Armenian Genocide.
Turkey’s position is the denial of that fact and counter arguments that there were reciprocal massacres in 1915. The best solution for Ankara would be if Armenia (1) steps back from calling the events in 1915-1923 genocide; (2) accepts the idea of reciprocal massacres and puts a memorial of Turkish victims just next to the memorial of Armenian Genocide at Tsitsernakaberd, Yerevan; (3) signs a treaty of friendship with Turkey iterating its recognition of the territorial integrity of Turkey; (4) makes considerable compromises to Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict.
The position of Armenia is the politics of recognition of Armenian Genocide throughout the world, the demand from Turkey to accept the Genocide and to deal with the implications. The best solution for Armenia would be if Turkey (1) accepts the Genocide; (2) signs a treaty of friendship with Armenia giving guarantees of security; (3) stops interfering in the Karabakh conflict by training, instructing and otherwise helping Azerbaijani part; (4) opens borders and communications for Armenia.

V. INTERESTS

Turkey
The motivation underlying the position consists of fears and concerns. Turkey has a history of facing a probability to be divided by the treaty of Sevres after being defeated in the WWI and even nowadays one of the cornerstones of Turkey’s foreign policy is “sevrophobia” and distrust towards others. Moreover, as a young and still unconsolidated nation Turkey fears that accepting the fact of the Armenian Genocide may impede the process of nation-building. That is the reason of having a special article (301) in the Turkish Penal Code that says “A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness … shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years”22.
The next fear of Turkey is the issue of territorial integrity in case of accepting the Genocide. The official Turkish position is that Armenia is doing all this just for one main reason – to take back the Western Armenia: “The ultimate objective is a “Great Armenia”, for which they designed the so called “ Four T plan” based on propaganda, recognition, indemnity and land23. The intention here is to rehabilitate the world public opinion by making them to accept … the existence of genocide against them, to force Turkey into recognizing it, to receive compensation in monetary terms and finally to seize from Turkey the land needed for realizing a Great Armenia”24.
It is in Turkish interests to have good relations and open border with Armenia as it would be good for public image, especially when dealing with Europe, and the open border and trade will accelerate the development of eastern regions of Turkey which is very important not only for the reasons of welfare of the poor ils that are in an impasse now but also for the prospects of European Union membership by having a proportionally developed regions and good relations with all the neighbors.
Turkey also dreams of being a major power (both political and economic) in the South Caucasian region as opposed to Iran and Russia. That is why the absence of relations with Armenia also indicates the incapability of Turkey to be a leader which is a challenge for Ankara.

Armenia
The motivation underlying the Armenian position consists of fears and concerns, too. Armenian-Turkish relations have bitter history of subjugation, massacres, genocide. The image of a Turk in Armenian collective memory is a bloodthirsty soldier wishing to erase Armenians off the world. This constitutes the main concern of Armenian foreign policy that is security. Armenia can give up everything if she can ensure her long-term security. If we look attentively at the main developments we can disclose the deep motivation of Armenia which is security. This type of motivation has its root in the memory of a nation subjected to genocide. Armenian-Russian strategic relations are mainly maintained because of a Turkish danger. The reasons of Karabakh war also lie within the spectrum of security issues.
As newly established state one of the wishes of Armenia is to have a stable and strong economy. That is, Armenia wants to have more options for export and import than Georgian and Iranian ways. Thus, good relations with Turkey are very important. But from other side, if we try to analyze also the other players within Armenia, we may see some oligarchic structures that are keeping monopole status in some spheres of the market and are very reluctant of giving up that practice if the border is opened.

VI. ZONES OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT?
Here, we have some common interests that could be negotiated about. The territorial integrity is of high importance for both of states. Both Turkey and Armenia think of one another of having some territorial claims or appetites. Certainly, there are nationalistic approaches within both countries: Armenians claiming back the Western Armenia according to the Treaty of Sevres (not thinking of having after that a population of approximately 15 million with only 3 million of Christian Armenians), and Turkish declaring that Yerevan is just a block between Turkey and the Great Turan of Turkic brother-nations and Armenia must be conquered and erased. But those circles are not gaining much public acceptance and both governments and population are eager for stability and peace.
The next common and complementary interest is the trade. Though Armenian market is relatively small for Turkey and the continuance of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is still blocking the high-way to East, but the use of Armenian railway can accelerate flows of Turkish export. Armenia is also interested in trade not only with Europe but also with Middle Eastern economies.
The third interest is the development of frontier regions. The open border will facilitate the development of the communities near the border and be more attractive for domestic and international investments.
But even taking this into account, it must be stressed that the positive zone of possible agreement between Armenia and Turkey is very small tending to slip into negative, so no assertive position can be applied by both of the parties.

CONCLUSION
The Armenian and Turkish parties are advised not to enter into political negotiations in this phase as they have nearly no positive ZOPA in political area. And especially the problem of Genocide should not be mentioned in any agreement or formal document.
As it is already clear from the background information, the Genocide issue constitutes a sacred value. Sacred values are the beliefs, customs, assumptions that form the basis of a culture’s belief system. People regard them to be so fundamental that they are neither discussable nor debatable. And sacred values resist trade-offs with other values, like economic values (in our case the opening of the border). So, we can say that those sacred values are beyond the reservation points25 and one who tries to change them will face a “no deal” formula.
Two societies need time to warm up their social and economic relations and that will help to raise the level of trust. The lack of mutual trust is the key factor in the relations between Armenia and Turkey, so future steps must focus in that direction.

REFERENCES
1. Armenia-Turkey: Open Dialogue (in Armenian), Yerevan, 2005. p. 108;
2. Ibid., ¿ç 109;
3. B.Gultekin, The Stakes of the Opening of Turkish-Armenian Border, French Institute of Anatolian Studies, Research Program on Turkey-Caucasus, Istanbul, 2002, p. 2;
4. Armenia-Turkey: Open Dialogue (in Armenian), Yerevan, 2005. p. 108;
5. Haroutiun Khachatrian, Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission Encounters Skeptisim, Eurasia Insight, 9/10/01, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091001.shtml;
6. E. Danielyan, Turkish-Armenian Panel Says Its Mision Is Complete, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp041804.shtml;
7. The Eurasia Representation Office in Armenia, Awarded Grants, Fiscal year 2006, http://www.eurasia.am/page.php?id=005&s=01; or Call for Proposals for Armenia-Turkey Cross-Border Dialogue and Cooperation Program, May 2007, http://www.eurasia.am/archive.php?id=008&s=01&yr=2007&m=5&t=Call%20for%20Proposals%20for%20Armenia-Turkey%20Cross-Border%20Dialogue%20and%20Cooperation%20Program;
8. Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead, Crisis Group Europe Report N°184, 17 August 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/184_turkey_and_europe___the_way_ahead.pdf;
9. Armenian Official Says No Secret Talks Held With Turkey In 2006, Arminfo, 1 Jun 06, http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/forum/showthread.php?t=51600;
10. Tatoul Markarian, A promising start?, The Washington Times, May 15, 2005, http://www.armeniaemb.org/News/Archive/Articles/Washingtontimes2005.htm;
11. Akhtamar Church Opened In Turkey, ArmRadio.am, 29.03.2007, 16:10, http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/forum/showthread.php?t=86553;
12. B.Gultekin, The Stakes of the Opening of Turkish-Armenian Border, p. 8;
13. Ibid, p. 12;
14. Ibid;
15. Ibid, p. 30;
16. T.Jrbashyan, Armenian-Turkish Border Rubikon, in Armenia-Turkey: Open Dialogue (in Armenian), Yerevan, 2005. p. 108;
17. This region represents 9% of Turkey’s GDP, it can be noticed that the products will easily be delivered to whole Turkey; the state of the Turkish road network will allow the Armenian producers to easily reach the Turkish market.
18. B.Gultekin, The Stakes of the Opening of Turkish-Armenian Border, p. 37;
19. Ibid;
20. T.Jrbashyan, Armenian-Turkish Border Rubikon, in Armenia-Turkey: Open Dialogue (in Armenian), Yerevan, 2005. p. 89-90;
21. R.Safrastyan, The Meaning of Armenian - Turkish Border, in Armenia-Turkey: Open Dialogue (in Armenian), Yerevan, 2005. p. 63;
22. Türk Ceza Kanunu, Madde 301, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html;
23. In Turkish all the words begin with “T”: Tanıtım, Tanınma, Tazminat and Toprak;
24. Armenian Issue: Allegations – facts, (a website offering the official position of Turkey), http://www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr/english/intro/four_t.html;
25. The term “reservation point” is taken from Leigh L.Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, 3rd edition, New Jersey, 2004, 434 pages;