http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/en-EUMokoFeed10http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/http://data5.blog.de/design/preview/e3/b734d3e628fa1b4ea83dcf1e7dd4ad_160x200.jpghttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/08/05/turkey-removed-the-brackets-at-istanbul-conference-6654383/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2009-08-05:/2009/08/05/turkey-removed-the-brackets-at-istanbul-conference-6654383/Wed, 05 Aug 2009 06:22:25 +0200 <p>/PanARMENIAN.Net/ On May 26-27 Istanbul hosted a conference on Armenian-Turkish relations on the initiative of SETA Research Center. As conference participant, turkologist Artak Shakaryan reported to PanARMENIAN.Net, the conference was conducted in accordance with Chatham House principles. Conference participants were obligated to remain silent on some issues. </p> <p>“On the whole, the conference was held in good neighborly atmosphere. As no media representatives attended the conference, participants were free to express their thoughts and even to “removed the brackets” in some cases,” Shakaryan noted. According to turkologist, at the conference Turkish part repeatedly emphasized the idea that Azerbaijan and Turkey are “one nation, two states”. “Turkish participants repeatedly stated that no progress will be registered in Armenian-Turkish relations, unless there’s any progress in NKR conflict settlement. Armenia representatives made it clear that if Ankara keeps setting NKR issue as a precondition, the dialogue between Armenia and Turkey will be frustrated. This was the most critical moment in the course of the conference,” the turkologist emphasized. According to Artak Shakaryan, the fact that SETA Center, conference organizer, acts as a mouthpiece of Turkey, should be taken into consideration. </p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/08/05/turkey-removed-the-brackets-at-istanbul-conference-6654383/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>istanbulnkrazerbaijansetaturkeyartakshakaryanarmenian-turkish-relationskarabakharmenian-turkishartak-shakaryanarmeniahttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/08/05/turkey-removed-the-brackets-at-istanbul-conference-6654383/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/08/05/baku-fears-lest-armenia-and-turkey-should-reach-agreement-6654369/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2009-08-05:/2009/08/05/baku-fears-lest-armenia-and-turkey-should-reach-agreement-6654369/Wed, 05 Aug 2009 06:19:08 +0200 <p>PanARMENIAN.Net/ Turkey always seeked to satisfy Azerbaijan, and PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan's recent statement in Baku fully fits the logic of such policy, Turkologist Artak Shakaryan told a PanARMENIAN.Net correspondent. “Turkey’s stance on Karabakh is not so tough as premier Erdogan thought in Baku. Only because the statement was made in Baku it sounded so tough,” Mr. Shakarayan noted. According to the Turkologist, Azrbaijan perfectly realizes that Armenian-Turkish talks continue, considering Washington and Moscow’s interest in the process. Baku fears lest American scenario should work, leading to Armenian-Turkish ties normalization. Not to be left alone in such situation, Baku needs Moscow’s support,” Mr. Shakaryan stressed.</p> <p>After meeting with Azeri President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Erdogan declared Turkey’s determination of not opening border unless Karabakh issue is settled. “The current situation in Nagorno Karabak cannot and will not ever be accepted. Border was closed because of Karabakh conflict,” Turkish premier told a news conference in Baku. </p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/08/05/baku-fears-lest-armenia-and-turkey-should-reach-agreement-6654369/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>nagorno-karabakhkarabakhartak-shakaryanazerbaijanwashingtonarmeniarecep-tayyip-erdoganbakuilham-aliyevmoscowturkeyazeriarmenian-turkishartakshakaryanhttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/08/05/baku-fears-lest-armenia-and-turkey-should-reach-agreement-6654369/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/08/05/armenian-turkologist-precludes-the-possibility-of-turkish-armenian-border-opening-on-apr-6654352/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2009-08-05:/2009/08/05/armenian-turkologist-precludes-the-possibility-of-turkish-armenian-border-opening-on-apr-6654352/Wed, 05 Aug 2009 06:15:30 +0200 <p>02.04.2009 17:15 GMT+04:00<br> /PanARMENIAN.Net/ Possibility of Turkish-Armenian border opening on Apr. 16 and establishment of diplomatic relations between Yerevan and Ankara on Apr. 16 is almost unlikely. Turkey will not risk this step, especially before Apr. 24, an Armenian turkologist Artak Shakaryan told a PanARMENIAN.Net reporter at a news conference in Yerevan.</p> <p>“Armenian-Turkish relations is a high level diplomatic game. US President is visiting Ankara to discuss possibilities of reestablishment of relations between Washington and Tehran, Turkish –Russian ties and withdrawal of American troops from Iraq,” Artak Shakaryan noted.<br> According to the Armenian turkologist, both Russia and US might benefit from intensification of Armenian-Turkish ties, so President Obama will not use the word Genocide in his address to Armenian Diaspora.</p> <p>''Armenian Genocide recognition allows USA to leverage its influence on Ankara. I believe, Obama will not recognize the Genocide in his address, but, in exchange, will demand Ankara to mitigate its policy towards Yerevan. Upon which, Ali Babacan, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs will arrive in Yerevan to demonstrate Turkey's warmer position towards Armenia,'' Artak Shakaryan stated.</p> <p>Wall Street Journal, citing a diplomatic source in Brussels, circulated information on possibility of Turkish –Armenian border opening and establishment of diplomatic relations on Apr. 16. Neither side provided official comments on the assertion above.</p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/08/05/armenian-turkologist-precludes-the-possibility-of-turkish-armenian-border-opening-on-apr-6654352/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>turkeyyerevanarmenian-genocidebabacanobamadiasporashakaryanwall-street-journalarmeniaartakusaborderhttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/08/05/armenian-turkologist-precludes-the-possibility-of-turkish-armenian-border-opening-on-apr-6654352/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/02/03/1055-1091-1073-1083-1080-1095-1085-1099-1081-1076-1077-1084-1072-1088-1096-1087-1088-1077-1084-1100-1077-1088-1084-1080-1085-1080-1089-1090-1088--5497904/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2009-02-03:/2009/02/03/1055-1091-1073-1083-1080-1095-1085-1099-1081-1076-1077-1084-1072-1088-1096-1087-1088-1077-1084-1100-1077-1088-1084-1080-1085-1080-1089-1090-1088--5497904/Tue, 03 Feb 2009 11:18:19 +0100 <p>Обострение турецко-израильских отношений не окажет ощутимого влияния на антиармянскую политику еврейского лобби в Америке в вопросе признания США армянского Геноцида. Такое мнение высказал на пресс-конференции 2 февраля тюрколог, сотрудник Института востоковедения НАН Армении Артак Шакарян, сообщает корреспондент ИА REGNUM.</p> <p>"По большому счету, публичный демарш премьер-министра Турции Реджепа Тайипа Эрдогана в Давосе был направлен против Ирана: подобным шагом Эрдоган вырвал лидерство у иранского президента, как публичного защитника исламского мира. Своим поступком в Давосе Эрдоган также рассчитывает на увеличение голосов в пользу возглавляемой им партии "Справедливости и развития" перед выборами в органы местного самоуправления Турции, назначенными на 29 марта. Здесь речь может идти о 5-10% прибавки голосов избирателей к уже имеющимся 45%", - сказал турколог.</p> <p>По его мнению ухудшение турецко-израильских отношений не окажет ощутимого влияния на антиармянскую политику еврейского лобби в Америке. "Турецко-израильские межгосударственные отношения настолько сильны и важны для обеих стран, что их временное ухудшение на фоне военной операции Израиля против Газы, равно как и демарш Эрдогана в Давосе, не окажут ощутимого влияния на антиармянскую политику еврейского лобби в Америке в вопросе признания США армянского геноцида. Евреи болезненно относятся к Холокосту, подчеркивая его уникальность, и у них нет особого желания содействовать признанию еще одного геноцида", - отметил Артак Шакарян</p> <p>Опубликовано 16:20 02.02.2009<br> Документ: <a href="http://www.regnum.ru/news/1119172.html">http://www.regnum.ru/news/1119172.html</a></p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/02/03/1055-1091-1073-1083-1080-1095-1085-1099-1081-1076-1077-1084-1072-1088-1096-1087-1088-1077-1084-1100-1077-1088-1084-1080-1085-1080-1089-1090-1088--5497904/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>%D1%8D%D1%80%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%81%D1%88%D0%B0%D1%88%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8F%D0%BDhttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/02/03/1055-1091-1073-1083-1080-1095-1085-1099-1081-1076-1077-1084-1072-1088-1096-1087-1088-1077-1084-1100-1077-1088-1084-1080-1085-1080-1089-1090-1088--5497904/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/01/30/turkey-knows-that-obama-may-recognize-armenian-genocide-5473730/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2009-01-30:/2009/01/30/turkey-knows-that-obama-may-recognize-armenian-genocide-5473730/Fri, 30 Jan 2009 10:01:24 +0100 <p>/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The recent developments, specifically the war in South Ossetia, resulted in Russia’s attempts to exclude Georgia from regional projects. In this context, Turkish-Armenian relations acquire special significance, an Armenian expert said. </p> <p>“The thaw between Yerevan and Ankara is much spoken about. 2009 is mentioned as the year of reconciliation. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the EU is to make a decision on Turkey’s accession bid in October or November 2009. Under the circumstances, it’s natural that Ankara pretends willingness to normalize relations with Armenia,” turcologist Artak Shakaryan told a PanARMENIAN.Net reporter. </p> <p>Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan’s statements that the problems between Armenia and Turkey can be resolved 2009 should not be taken for granted, according to him. </p> <p>“Ankara knows that April 24 is not far off and that new U.S. President can recognize the Armenian Genocide. Turkey tries to persuade the international community to refrain from recognition of the Genocide alleging that Yerevan and Ankara are close to reconciliation. This is Turkey’s diplomacy,” Mr. Shakaryan said.</p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/01/30/turkey-knows-that-obama-may-recognize-armenian-genocide-5473730/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>babacanusaturkeyforeignarmeniaartakshakaryanobama1915genocidehttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2009/01/30/turkey-knows-that-obama-may-recognize-armenian-genocide-5473730/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2008/08/25/1048-1085-1080-1094-1080-1072-1090-1080-1074-1072-1058-1091-1088-1094-1080-1080-1076-1072-1089-1090-1074-1086-1079-1084-1086-1078-1085-1086-1089--4633215/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2008-08-25:/2008/08/25/1048-1085-1080-1094-1080-1072-1090-1080-1074-1072-1058-1091-1088-1094-1080-1080-1076-1072-1089-1090-1074-1086-1079-1084-1086-1078-1085-1086-1089--4633215/Mon, 25 Aug 2008 08:12:00 +0200 <p>"Инициатива Турции о создании системы безопасности на Кавказе призвана усилить влияние Анкары в регионе", - заявил в беседе с корреспондентом ИА REGNUM старший сотрудник Института востоковедения Национальной академии наук Армении Артак Шакарян. По его словам, посредничество Турции в создании такой системы совместно с Тбилиси и Москвой повысит уровень PR Турции на международной арене. Эксперт заметил, что в последнее время Анкара уже не пользуется имиджем "жандарма Соединенных Штатов", в то же время, по его словам, пока рано говорить о ее полной независимости от Вашингтона. "Вопрос евроинтеграции затягивается, и Турция все еще связывает большие надежды с США" - пояснил он.</p> <p>Артак Шакарян отметил, что факт отказа турецких властей пропустить суда американского военно-морского флота через находящиеся под ее юрисдикцией проливы в Черное море, не говорит о том, что Анкара изменила Вашингтону. Он заметил, что этим шагом Турция показала верность всем тем международным договорам, которые запрещают военным судам проходить через эти проливы. По словам Шакаряна, несмотря на то, что активно развиваются экономические российско-турецкие отношения, в Анкаре сохраняется страх перед Москвой. Он заметил, что в первую очередь Турция опасается за те региональные проекты, в реализации которых она принимала активное участие - это нефтепровод Баку-Тбилиси-Джейхан и железнодорожная магистраль Карс- Ахалакалаки-Тбилиси-Баку.</p> <p>Возвращаясь к теме создания новой платформы безопасности на Кавказе, эксперт заметил, что Армения получит мало пользы от участия в ней. По мнению Шакаряна, для Армении инициатива Анкары станет лишь возможностью "выйти в свет", однако при этом в "Кавказской большой игре" Еревану придется "играть" отведенную ему роль или посредника, или наблюдателя.</p> <p>Отметим, что по данным McClatchy Newspapers, полученным от официальных источников в американской администрации, поручение Буша подключить к доставке "гуманитарных грузов" в Грузию через проливы Босфор и Дарданеллы кораблями ВМС США оказалось невыполнимыми. Турецкие власти отказались пропускать суда в Черное море без предварительного согласования данного процесса с официальными ведомствами, в том числе и военными, Турции.</p> <p>Напомним, что по сообщению газеты "Turkish Daily News" 20 августа премьер-министр Турции Реджеп Тайип Эрдоган заявил, что министр иностранных дел Турции Али Бабаджан встретится и обсудит вопрос о создании новой Платформы безопасности на Кавказе с главой МИД России, затем проведет обсуждения с Арменией. 20 августа министр иностранных дел Армении Эдвард Налбандян заявил, что приветствует заявление премьер-министра Турции о намерении начать переговоры между двумя странами по этим вопросам.</p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2008/08/25/1048-1085-1080-1094-1080-1072-1090-1080-1074-1072-1058-1091-1088-1094-1080-1080-1076-1072-1089-1090-1074-1086-1079-1084-1086-1078-1085-1086-1089--4633215/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B3%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%8F%D1%88%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8F%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%88%D0%B0%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE-%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%86%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8Fhttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2008/08/25/1048-1085-1080-1094-1080-1072-1090-1080-1074-1072-1058-1091-1088-1094-1080-1080-1076-1072-1089-1090-1074-1086-1079-1084-1086-1078-1085-1086-1089--4633215/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2008/03/18/armenia-and-turkey-an-analysis-of-positi-3899483/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2008-03-18:/2008/03/18/armenia-and-turkey-an-analysis-of-positi-3899483/Tue, 18 Mar 2008 12:35:43 +0100 <p>ARTAK SHAKARYAN</p> <p>INTRODUCTION<br> Armenian-Turkish relations are considered one of the most problematic issues the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to deal with. Moreover, it is one of the most crucial problems of the newly independent Republic of Armenia.<br> Due to its deep nature, the problem of Armenian-Turkish relations is interwoven in almost all other issues and relations: the Karabakh conflict; economic stability; the relations of Armenia with Russia, USA, EU (France in particular), Middle East (Syria and Israel in particular), Georgia, Iran and Azerbaijan. That is why the problem needs to be analyzed by a vast number of scholars, and many alternatives should be presented to the society and decision-makers.<br> This current study is an attempt to understand the unseen or unspoken factors of the issue. The study is an analysis of the two major parties of the issue, their psychology, the inner motivations, the zones of possible agreement. Here, I conclude that Armenia and Turkey have a very narrow zone of possible agreement and no political issue should be publicly discussed yet. Two societies need time to warm up their social and economic relations and that will help to raise the level of trust. The lack of mutual trust is the key factor in the relations between Armenia and Turkey, so future steps must focus in that direction.</p> <p>I. RELATIONSHIP-BUILDING</p> <p>The milestones in the history and recent developments<br> Armenian-Turkish relations are dated back to the Middle Ages when the first Turkic nomadic tribes settled in the Middle East and the Caucasus. With the rise of the Ottoman Empire, the western part of Armenia passed under the control of the Sublime Porte, and Armenians became one of the largest Christian minorities within the Empire.<br> With the industrialization of the Empire, Armenians acquired many important positions and were called “Millet-i sadika” (“the loyal nation”). The rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, the threat of advancement of Russians in WWI on the Caucasian borders and other deeper motives that are not the subject of this paper resulted in the events of 1915-1923 years that Armenians call Genocide and Turks call reciprocal massacres.<br> Since those times, the Armenian-Turkish relations are anchored in 1915. All other states try to use that situation in favor of own interests, playing that card when they want to take something from Yerevan or Ankara.<br> The beginning of modern Armenian-Turkish relations was overshadowed also by Karabakh conflict. Though on December 16, 1991 the Government of Turkey officially recognized the independence of the Republic of Armenia, only 6 months later Turkey declared its readiness to be engaged in the Karabakh conflict as a third conflicting party which was stopped by the threat of Russians to be involved in the conflict as well1. However, each advance of Armenian part got harsh response from Ankara side. Finally this resulted in the decision of the Turkish Government to close Armenian-Turkish border as a reaction to the activities of Armenian army in the Karvachar/Kelbadjar region in April 19932. “On April 3, 1993, the government announces its decision to put an end to the wheat delivery which Turkey makes towards Armenia and not to let anymore any kind of aid destined for Armenia, over the Turkish territory”3.<br> The border opening is considered a precondition for development of bilateral relations. Being a major power in the region, Ankara tries to be assertive in the dialogue, and the Turkish part is sure that the closed border and the blockade of Armenia will force Yerevan to accept the Turkish preconditions. Turkish side tries to use the issue of opening the border in every negotiation with Yerevan in order to get a compromise from the Armenian part.<br> These preconditions give perfect outline of the main issues in Armenian-Turkish relations: renunciation from the policy of recognition of Armenian Genocide, recognition of territorial integrity of Turkey, and unilateral compromises in the Karabakh conflict.<br> The Armenian part seemingly did some steps forward, such as announcing its refusal from the policy of internalization of the genocide issue (president L.Ter-Petrosyan). Getting no positive response the next president R.Kocharyan had to step back in order to receive nationwide approval for the first years of his presidency and support of nationalistic parties. But even though the policy of recognition of Armenian Genocide is believed to be one of the basic points on the political agenda of Yerevan, Armenian officials has repeatedly declared that Armenia is open to dialogue with Turkey and makes no precondition for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Armenian authorities have also declared that Yerevan recognizes the territorial integrity of Turkey and the Kars agreement of 1921, but still refuses to take a notion on Western Armenia (i.e. eastern part of Turkey) from its Constitution which is the main concern of Turkey.<br> United States have contributed much to the efforts of second track (or public) diplomacy. The first effort took place in 1997 with the establishment of Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council4. In 1997, during the Summit of the Head of States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in Istanbul, institutionalization of the economic relations between Turkey and Armenia was put on the agenda. A group of Turkish and Armenian businessmen, mostly working in the transport and logistics sector and having collaborated for the delivery of American humanitarian aid to Armenia, proposed forming a Turkish-Armenian Business Council. The second effort was the formation of the reconciliation commission, or TARC, that announced in 2001 following meetings held under the auspices of the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna. The group comprised four Armenian and six Turkish representatives. None of the members has any direct link to either the Armenian or Turkish governments, yet most have extensive political connections5. The initiator and coordinator was US diplomat Davis Philips. The Commission did not have long life. It prepared several advice packages on the issue of normalization of the bilateral relations, and the content of those is still secret6.<br> US Government and USAID back Eurasia Foundation and some other organizations in Armenia in giving large amounts of grant awards to non-governmental organizations for organizing second-track diplomacy initiatives such as exchanges of journalists and businessmen, conferences on the issues of the opening of the border, etc7.<br> Officials note that in practice Turkey deals with Armenia through its Tbilisi embassy8; and various sources from time to time declare that Armenian and Turkish representatives are holding secret talks. This information is confirmed both by Armenian and Turkish authorities9. The meetings of the MFA representatives generally try to prepare the common ground for the upcoming meetings of the foreign ministers or other state officials.<br> Back in 2005, as the 90th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide approached, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan came up with an initiative in a letter to Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, proposing creation of a joint commission to address the history. In response, Mr. Kocharyan called on Turkey to establish diplomatic relations and open its border with Armenia without preconditions, and to form an intergovernmental commission to address all bilateral concerns10.<br> The public diplomacy methods used by Turkish side to not limit with the above mentioned ones. The Church of the Holy Cross on Akhtamar Island in Lake Van was opened in Turkey in March 2007. The opening ceremony was attended by the Armenian delegation headed by RA Deputy Minister of Culture and Youth Affairs Gagik Gyurjyan. Also present was the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople Mesrop Archbishop Mutafyan. From the Turkish side the ceremony was attended by Culture Minister Atilla Koch11. It is worth to mention that though the church was opened as a museum still it constitutes an important PR message to Armenia and the international community that Turkey has a lot of place to make little compromises if Armenia is willing to give up something as well.</p> <p>The closed borders in the age of globalization: profitable trade detours the closed borders like a river detour obstacles to reach to the sea<br> The pretext for the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border was Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and the situation during the Karabakh war. It was a symbolic act to show Baku that newly independent Azerbaijan should chose Turkey as the senior partner instead of Russia or any other country. So far, the reluctance of Ankara to open the border can be also explained by political aspects of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. Baku will regard the opening of the border as the most unfriendly act Ankara can do.<br> However, closed borders do not mean that there are no Turkish-Armenian relations and communications at all. The exchanges and the contacts between Turkey and Armenia are executed via different ways of communication. The air corridor which was opened in 1996 connects Istanbul and Yerevan. Road transport passes across a third country: merchandises and passengers have to traverse either Iranian or Georgian territory12.<br> Despite the closure of the border, according to the data collected by the American Embassy in Yerevan; Turkey is the seventh commercial partner of Armenia. There is an established flow of exchanges between Armenia and Turkey. Turkish authorities evaluate it between 70 and 150 millions of dollars per year while the estimations of the Armenian authorities give an amount increasing to 250 million per year13. The wide range of estimations is due the fact that exportation to Armenia is not allowed and the final destination of the Turkish goods going to Armenia is mentioned to be Georgia and sometimes Russia14.<br> The professionals of the transport and logistics sector declare that, in case the Turkish-Armenian border opens, the Georgian transit traffic towards Armenia may be forsaken, in a month, for the Turkish ports along the Black Sea as in case of the utilization of the Turkish ports along the Black Sea, road transport costs might be diminished by 25%. The economies made may reach 1.9 millions of dollars, or, if a quarter of the traffic continues to be done through the port of Poti, 1.4 millions of dollars. In this case, Georgia’s loss in transit revenues would be 5.6 and 7.4 millions of dollars; which would equal to a diminution by 16-20% of the excessive gains obtained from the cargo services, in the balance of payments15.<br> Turkish railroad system is very necessary for Armenia as an alternative to Georgian way. Currently more than 90% of Armenian exports go through Georgian ports. More than 1000 goods wagon a month is coming to Armenia from Batumi (Georgia).<br> Mediterranean ports of Turkey are of much interest for Armenia because Black Sea ports do not give opportunity to use oceanic container ships that are much cheaper. And more, having Armenian using the alternative Turkish way, Georgia will be forced to decrease passage fees16.<br> The regional market includes Georgia, Azerbaijan, north-western Iran and eastern and south-eastern Turkey17: a market with 50 millions of consumers, which represents a GDP of 10 billions of dollars. In terms of GDP, eastern and south-eastern Turkey and north-western Iran represent one third of the regional market.<br> Closed borders cut both ways<br> The closure of the border hinders not only the development of Armenia but also Turkey. It is comprehended in Turkey not only by the population residing near the border but also by businessmen. The Association of Industrialists and Businessmen in Turkey, TÜSİAD, states that it is in favor of the development of economic and commercial relations with Turkey. TÜSİAD tries to promote the relations with the Armenian private sector. On the other hand, the Unions of Exporters, official structures depending on the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, clearly criticize the politics regarding Armenia. The closure of the border, which means an embargo decision, does not have a political efficiency, according to the authorities of the Unions of Exporters in the visited regions. This measure has only limited the exportation capacities of small and medium sized enterprises implanted in the regions distant from the economic center18.<br> The relations with the region and the distance from the center determine the relation with the border. The approach developed at the national level usually contradicts the perception of the population residing in the border regions. The opening of the border and the establishment of direct commercial relations with Armenia are the priorities for the cities of Kars, Iğdır and Trabzon19.<br> This is the main card that Armenia can play: the opening of Armenian-Turkish border would accelerate the development of eastern ils of Turkey. The development indicators of these regions significantly differ from the medium indicators along Turkey. Hence, if in 2002 GDP per capita in Armenia was $ 2,950, and while the same indicator in Turkey was about $ 6,000, in eastern regions of Turkey the indicator was 5 times lower than that in Turkey in general (about $ 1,200)20. This means that the eastern regions of Turkey are far less developed than Armenia and they have actually a lot to gain from the open border. Therefore, Ankara can develop those regions even without additional investments. During past years Turkey has invested great amount of money and issued special regional tax advantages for the development of these regions but without any tangible result: having an impasse with the closed border makes no meaning for building factories or operating large companies.<br> Moreover, domestic migration rates are very high in these eastern regions. High-qualified workers and university graduates tend to migrate to the western regions and in case of normal relations many workplaces will be opened and also Armenia can help the eastern parts of Turkey with qualified professionals it needs much21.<br> Re-opening of Armenian-Turkish border is of much importance for railroad connection between Turkey and Central Asian Turkic countries. This has both economic and politic meaning for Ankara. Trade develops very slowly with TIR Lorries and the penetration of Turkish business cannot compete with Russian capital flows. However, instead of using Kars (Turkey) - Gyumri (Armenia) railroad, Ankara tries to exert pressure on Armenia by building Kars – Akhalkalaki (Georgia) very expensive railroad to bypass Armenia.</p> <p>II. PARTIES</p> <p>The main parties in this conflict are Turkey and Armenia. There are both nationalistic and liberal factions in both countries. The army is very powerful in both countries, especially in Turkey.<br> All the regional countries are using Turkish-Armenian confrontation for their own interests, so they would likely hinder any reconciliation process.<br> • Georgia and Iran gain much from Armenia using traverse routs to Turkey or Turkey detouring Armenia via these countries. Currently more than 90% of Armenian exports go through Georgian ports.<br> • Azerbaijan believes that harsh blockade of Armenia hinders its economic development that will help Baku to have a revanche solving the Karabakh issue with hard power.</p> <p>Major global powers Russia, EU and USA have different approaches to the problem.<br>  Russia maintains its strategic relations with Armenia and develops economic relations with Turkey. Russia is unwilling for the possible reconciliation as open border with Turkey would make Armenia more independent and open a way to the Western markets a factor that could push Armenia towards Western orientation.<br>  EU uses Turkish-Armenian problem as a playing card against Ankara. The reconciliation would make that stick softer. Although European Union presses Turkey for the recognition of Armenian Genocide and the opening of the borders, it does so more because of its reluctance to accept Ankara to European family.<br>  USA realizes that closed borders and unfriendly Turkey are the main factors of Armenia’s Russian orientation. That is why Washington puts much effort in the bilateral talks and reconciliation steps.<br> Armenian Diaspora constitutes a separate party. Armenian Diaspora is one of the ardent opponents of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation if that settlement would imply renunciation from the politics of recognition of the Armenian genocide.</p> <p>III. ISSUES</p> <p>The main issue is the absence of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, Turkish preconditions for the opening of the closed border and the bitter of the Armenian genocide.<br> Armenia believes that Turkey:<br> 1. committed the Genocide;<br> 2. is reluctant to recognize that;<br> 3. helps Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict;<br> 4. is very hostile towards Armenia;<br> 5. will use every opportunity to endanger Armenia’s security.</p> <p>Turkey believes that Armenia:<br> 1. slanders Turkey about the “so-called” Genocide;<br> 2. will try to endanger the territorial integrity of Turkey if there is an opportunity (‘sevrophobia’);<br> 3. uses the politics of recognition to demand financial compensation from Turkey;<br> 4. has unjustly occupied the territory of “brother-country” Azerbaijan.<br> For Armenia the main issue is the guarantee of security from Turkey, and for Turkey the main issue is the territorial integrity of the state.</p> <p>IV. POSITIONS</p> <p>The key issue between two parties is the fact of Armenian Genocide.<br> Turkey’s position is the denial of that fact and counter arguments that there were reciprocal massacres in 1915. The best solution for Ankara would be if Armenia (1) steps back from calling the events in 1915-1923 genocide; (2) accepts the idea of reciprocal massacres and puts a memorial of Turkish victims just next to the memorial of Armenian Genocide at Tsitsernakaberd, Yerevan; (3) signs a treaty of friendship with Turkey iterating its recognition of the territorial integrity of Turkey; (4) makes considerable compromises to Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict.<br> The position of Armenia is the politics of recognition of Armenian Genocide throughout the world, the demand from Turkey to accept the Genocide and to deal with the implications. The best solution for Armenia would be if Turkey (1) accepts the Genocide; (2) signs a treaty of friendship with Armenia giving guarantees of security; (3) stops interfering in the Karabakh conflict by training, instructing and otherwise helping Azerbaijani part; (4) opens borders and communications for Armenia.</p> <p>V. INTERESTS</p> <p>Turkey<br> The motivation underlying the position consists of fears and concerns. Turkey has a history of facing a probability to be divided by the treaty of Sevres after being defeated in the WWI and even nowadays one of the cornerstones of Turkey’s foreign policy is “sevrophobia” and distrust towards others. Moreover, as a young and still unconsolidated nation Turkey fears that accepting the fact of the Armenian Genocide may impede the process of nation-building. That is the reason of having a special article (301) in the Turkish Penal Code that says “A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness … shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years”22.<br> The next fear of Turkey is the issue of territorial integrity in case of accepting the Genocide. The official Turkish position is that Armenia is doing all this just for one main reason – to take back the Western Armenia: “The ultimate objective is a “Great Armenia”, for which they designed the so called “ Four T plan” based on propaganda, recognition, indemnity and land23. The intention here is to rehabilitate the world public opinion by making them to accept … the existence of genocide against them, to force Turkey into recognizing it, to receive compensation in monetary terms and finally to seize from Turkey the land needed for realizing a Great Armenia”24.<br> It is in Turkish interests to have good relations and open border with Armenia as it would be good for public image, especially when dealing with Europe, and the open border and trade will accelerate the development of eastern regions of Turkey which is very important not only for the reasons of welfare of the poor ils that are in an impasse now but also for the prospects of European Union membership by having a proportionally developed regions and good relations with all the neighbors.<br> Turkey also dreams of being a major power (both political and economic) in the South Caucasian region as opposed to Iran and Russia. That is why the absence of relations with Armenia also indicates the incapability of Turkey to be a leader which is a challenge for Ankara. </p> <p>Armenia<br> The motivation underlying the Armenian position consists of fears and concerns, too. Armenian-Turkish relations have bitter history of subjugation, massacres, genocide. The image of a Turk in Armenian collective memory is a bloodthirsty soldier wishing to erase Armenians off the world. This constitutes the main concern of Armenian foreign policy that is security. Armenia can give up everything if she can ensure her long-term security. If we look attentively at the main developments we can disclose the deep motivation of Armenia which is security. This type of motivation has its root in the memory of a nation subjected to genocide. Armenian-Russian strategic relations are mainly maintained because of a Turkish danger. The reasons of Karabakh war also lie within the spectrum of security issues.<br> As newly established state one of the wishes of Armenia is to have a stable and strong economy. That is, Armenia wants to have more options for export and import than Georgian and Iranian ways. Thus, good relations with Turkey are very important. But from other side, if we try to analyze also the other players within Armenia, we may see some oligarchic structures that are keeping monopole status in some spheres of the market and are very reluctant of giving up that practice if the border is opened.</p> <p>VI. ZONES OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT?<br> Here, we have some common interests that could be negotiated about. The territorial integrity is of high importance for both of states. Both Turkey and Armenia think of one another of having some territorial claims or appetites. Certainly, there are nationalistic approaches within both countries: Armenians claiming back the Western Armenia according to the Treaty of Sevres (not thinking of having after that a population of approximately 15 million with only 3 million of Christian Armenians), and Turkish declaring that Yerevan is just a block between Turkey and the Great Turan of Turkic brother-nations and Armenia must be conquered and erased. But those circles are not gaining much public acceptance and both governments and population are eager for stability and peace.<br> The next common and complementary interest is the trade. Though Armenian market is relatively small for Turkey and the continuance of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is still blocking the high-way to East, but the use of Armenian railway can accelerate flows of Turkish export. Armenia is also interested in trade not only with Europe but also with Middle Eastern economies.<br> The third interest is the development of frontier regions. The open border will facilitate the development of the communities near the border and be more attractive for domestic and international investments.<br> But even taking this into account, it must be stressed that the positive zone of possible agreement between Armenia and Turkey is very small tending to slip into negative, so no assertive position can be applied by both of the parties.</p> <p>CONCLUSION<br> The Armenian and Turkish parties are advised not to enter into political negotiations in this phase as they have nearly no positive ZOPA in political area. And especially the problem of Genocide should not be mentioned in any agreement or formal document.<br> As it is already clear from the background information, the Genocide issue constitutes a sacred value. Sacred values are the beliefs, customs, assumptions that form the basis of a culture’s belief system. People regard them to be so fundamental that they are neither discussable nor debatable. And sacred values resist trade-offs with other values, like economic values (in our case the opening of the border). So, we can say that those sacred values are beyond the reservation points25 and one who tries to change them will face a “no deal” formula.<br> Two societies need time to warm up their social and economic relations and that will help to raise the level of trust. The lack of mutual trust is the key factor in the relations between Armenia and Turkey, so future steps must focus in that direction.</p> <p>REFERENCES<br> 1. Armenia-Turkey: Open Dialogue (in Armenian), Yerevan, 2005. p. 108;<br> 2. Ibid., ¿ç 109;<br> 3. B.Gultekin, The Stakes of the Opening of Turkish-Armenian Border, French Institute of Anatolian Studies, Research Program on Turkey-Caucasus, Istanbul, 2002, p. 2;<br> 4. Armenia-Turkey: Open Dialogue (in Armenian), Yerevan, 2005. p. 108;<br> 5. Haroutiun Khachatrian, Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission Encounters Skeptisim, Eurasia Insight, 9/10/01, <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091001.shtml;">http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091001.shtml;</a><br> 6. E. Danielyan, Turkish-Armenian Panel Says Its Mision Is Complete, <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp041804.shtml;">www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp041804.shtml;</a><br> 7. The Eurasia Representation Office in Armenia, Awarded Grants, Fiscal year 2006, <a href="http://www.eurasia.am/page.php?id=005&s=01;">http://www.eurasia.am/page.php?id=005&s=01;</a> or Call for Proposals for Armenia-Turkey Cross-Border Dialogue and Cooperation Program, May 2007, <a href="http://www.eurasia.am/archive.php?id=008&s=01&yr=2007&m=5&t=Call%20for%20Proposals%20for%20Armenia-Turkey%20Cross-Border%20Dialogue%20and%20Cooperation%20Program;">http://www.eurasia.am/archive.php?id=008&s=01&yr=2007&m=5&t=Call%20for%20Proposals%20for%20Armenia-Turkey%20Cross-Border%20Dialogue%20and%20Cooperation%20Program;</a><br> 8. Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead, Crisis Group Europe Report N°184, 17 August 2007, <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/184_turkey_and_europe___the_way_ahead.pdf;">http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/184_turkey_and_europe___the_way_ahead.pdf;</a><br> 9. Armenian Official Says No Secret Talks Held With Turkey In 2006, Arminfo, 1 Jun 06, <a href="http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/forum/showthread.php?t=51600;">http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/forum/showthread.php?t=51600;</a><br> 10. Tatoul Markarian, A promising start?, The Washington Times, May 15, 2005, <a href="http://www.armeniaemb.org/News/Archive/Articles/Washingtontimes2005.htm;">http://www.armeniaemb.org/News/Archive/Articles/Washingtontimes2005.htm;</a><br> 11. Akhtamar Church Opened In Turkey, ArmRadio.am, 29.03.2007, 16:10, <a href="http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/forum/showthread.php?t=86553;">http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/forum/showthread.php?t=86553;</a><br> 12. B.Gultekin, The Stakes of the Opening of Turkish-Armenian Border, p. 8;<br> 13. Ibid, p. 12;<br> 14. Ibid;<br> 15. Ibid, p. 30;<br> 16. T.Jrbashyan, Armenian-Turkish Border Rubikon, in Armenia-Turkey: Open Dialogue (in Armenian), Yerevan, 2005. p. 108;<br> 17. This region represents 9% of Turkey’s GDP, it can be noticed that the products will easily be delivered to whole Turkey; the state of the Turkish road network will allow the Armenian producers to easily reach the Turkish market.<br> 18. B.Gultekin, The Stakes of the Opening of Turkish-Armenian Border, p. 37;<br> 19. Ibid;<br> 20. T.Jrbashyan, Armenian-Turkish Border Rubikon, in Armenia-Turkey: Open Dialogue (in Armenian), Yerevan, 2005. p. 89-90;<br> 21. R.Safrastyan, The Meaning of Armenian - Turkish Border, in Armenia-Turkey: Open Dialogue (in Armenian), Yerevan, 2005. p. 63;<br> 22. Türk Ceza Kanunu, Madde 301, <a href="http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html;">http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html;</a><br> 23. In Turkish all the words begin with “T”: Tanıtım, Tanınma, Tazminat and Toprak;<br> 24. Armenian Issue: Allegations – facts, (a website offering the official position of Turkey), <a href="http://www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr/english/intro/four_t.html;">http://www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr/english/intro/four_t.html;</a><br> 25. The term “reservation point” is taken from Leigh L.Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, 3rd edition, New Jersey, 2004, 434 pages;</p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2008/03/18/armenia-and-turkey-an-analysis-of-positi-3899483/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>russiaartakjrbashyanankarairanforeigneurasiarussiangeorgiayerevannegotiationstroopsmiddle-eastrailroadshakaryanruben1915safrastyanarmeniantigranturkeykarabakhturkishazerbaijaneuarmeniapolicygenocidehttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2008/03/18/armenia-and-turkey-an-analysis-of-positi-3899483/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/10/14/a_1069_a_1082_a_1089_a_1087_a_1077_a_108~3132004/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2007-10-13:/2007/10/14/a_1069_a_1082_a_1089_a_1087_a_1077_a_108~3132004/Sun, 14 Oct 2007 00:20:07 +0200 <p>12:46 13/10/2007<br> Находяшийся сейчас в США турковед Артак Шакарян в беседе с корреспондентом Panorama.am прокомментировал ситуацию вокруг принятия Комитетом иностранных дел Конгресса США 106 резолюции о геноциде армян. </p> <p>“Турция объявила, что отзовет своего посла, и заняла жесткую позицию по Ираку, даже угрожает закрыть для американцев военную базу “Инджилик””, - сказал он. Он напомнил, что подобные угрозы Турция высказывала и в адрес Франции, но между ними не нарушился ни торговый баланс, ни военное сотрудничество, а сегодня идет разговор о том, что Франция построит в Турции новую атомную станцию. </p> <p>Сколько бы Турция не угрожала, Анкара никуда не убежит от реалий современной политики. США - мощная сила, с которой надо считаться и иногда "проглатывать" ее действия, тем более, что администрация Буша хотя бы на уровне шоу попыталась сделать все возможное, чтобы предотвратить принятие резолюции”, - отметил Артак Шакарян. </p> <p>“Жесткие действия Анкары против США – просто показательная игра с целью продемонстрировать собственной аудитории, что она настроена серьезно против Вашингтона и не позволит попирать свои интересы с учетом все возрастающих в Турции националистических настроений”, - выразил мнение Шакарян и добавил, что этот шаг США больше всего оказался выгоден националистическим кругам Турции, которые используют его в своей речи и агитации.</p> <p>Источник: Panorama.am</p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/10/14/a_1069_a_1082_a_1089_a_1087_a_1077_a_108~3132004/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>%D1%88%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8F%D0%BD%D1%84%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%88%D0%B0%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%8D%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B4%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8Fhttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/10/14/a_1069_a_1082_a_1089_a_1087_a_1077_a_108~3132004/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/10/13/le_recrutement_des_janissaires_dans_l_em~3127567/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2007-10-13:/2007/10/13/le_recrutement_des_janissaires_dans_l_em~3127567/Sat, 13 Oct 2007 03:14:14 +0200 <p>lundi, 16 juillet 2007, par Behor </p> <p>Introduction :<br> Un jeune universitaire de l’académie des Sciences d’Arménie (qui ne peut être suspecté de sympathies pro turques), a fait une thèse sur le devsirme. Bien que la pratique ait été rude, on y trouve pas traces d’inhumanités turques particulières, sauf si on considère le fait d’enrôler dans une armée turque comme foncièrement "inhumain" </p> <p>Artak Shakaryan a étudié les registres de la Chancellerie (« Mühimme ») à Damas, ainsi que les « firmans » (décrets) du sultan, dont certains concernent le Devshirme et a publié une thèse dont le titre éclaire sur les sentiments de l’auteur : "Devsirme : la taxe sur le sang dans l’Empire ottoman"</p> <p>Or, ce livre, publié en arménien avec résumé en anglais, qui étudie le système de levée d’enfants des communautés non-musulmanes sous domination ottomane dans les Balkans, ne fait pas état d’actes de barbarie contre des enfants, tels que le titre le laisserait croire. Au contraire, il admet lui-même que la ponction d’adolescents chrétiens n’était pas faite dans le but de brimer les chrétiens, et que des turcs eux-mêmes tentaient de faire passer leur propres enfant pour chrétiens afin qu’ils puissent devenir janissaires.</p> <p>Concernant le fait que tous ne devenaient ni vizirs ni même janissaires, il s’agit plutôt des résultats d’une sélection que de la volonté de mettre en esclavage, et d’ailleurs, rien n’est trouvé sur un sort éventuellement funeste à leur encontre.</p> <p>Ressort également clairement que devenir musulman était consideré par les chrétiens comme une véritable excommunication, ce qui ne donne déjà pas une image particulièrement "ouverte aux autres religions" des chrétiens de l’époque.</p> <p>Les Janissaires, accompagnés de docteurs, se rendaient dans les zones rurales et levaient des recrues parmi les enfants âgés entre 6 et 16 ans. La palette d’âge était aussi large car on accordait plus d’importance à l’apparence physique qu’à l’âge réel des enfants. Un enfant devshirmé devait être en bonne santé, de taille et de corpulence moyennes. Les enfants déjà fiancés ne pouvaient être recrutés ; c’est en partie pour cette raison que beaucoup de familles fiançaient leurs enfants à un âge précoce. Une autre règle importante stipulait que les enfants ne devaient pas parler turc. Les enfants réquisitionnés et acheminés vers Istanbul étaient par la suite examinés par des experts qui, se basant essentiellement sur leurs caractéristiques physiques, émettaient un avis sur le domaine auquel ils devaient être affectés. On effectuait aussi des tests verbaux. Les enfants physiquement les plus présentables et les plus intelligents étaient envoyés au palais ; les autres étaient soit confiés aux Janissaires afin de devenir soldats, soit vendus comme esclaves. Selon les sources disponibles on peut estimer à environ 60 % la proportion des enfants qui devenaient esclaves, à 30 % ceux qui devenaient Janissaires, et seuls 10 % aboutissaient au palais. L’Etat ottoman s’étant étendu très rapidement après sa naissance, a très vite manqué de personnel. C’est ainsi qu’on institua d’abord un système de recrutement de chrétiens comme soldats mercenaires. Quelques historiens pensent que les Ottomans s’inspirèrent de l’exemple byzantin. C’est l’Etat ottoman qui adopta le premier l’idée de lever les enfants de ses sujets en guise d’impôt, afin de pallier à ce manque de personnel. Il existait déjà auparavant une taxe appelée « pencik » qui consistait à prélever un prisonnier de guerre sur cinq pour alimenter l’armée du sultan. A la fin du 16ème siècle, avec le ralentissement de l’expansion de l’Empire, le nombre de « pencik » disponibles se réduisit. Le système du Devshirme fut alors introduit afin de créer de nouvelles ressources. L’obstacle au recrutement de musulmans était qu’ils pouvaient avoir des parents ou des relations influents et que nombre d’entre eux parlaient turc. On trouve aussi des documents interdisant de recruter des Juifs et des Roms. Aucune explication n’est avancée pour cela, mais il existait par ailleurs une règle stipulant que les enfants ne devaient pas provenir des villes, or la plupart des Juifs y vivaient. On considérait effectivement que les enfants des villes étaient plus intelligents et donc davantage susceptibles de s’enfuir. La plupart des devshirmé sont originaires de la partie européenne de l’Empire, de Grèce, de Bulgarie, de Serbie et d’autres régions slaves. L’Etat préférait lever les enfants des leaders religieux et féodaux des différentes communautés assujetties. Ils pouvaient parfois essayer de tromper les autorités en éloignant leurs enfants du village. Les Janissaires, représentants de l’Etat, pouvaient cependant effectuer des vérifications dans le registre des baptêmes. Quand les Janissaires arrivaient, les villageois avertissaient les villages environnants de leur venue. Il arrivait aussi que, même après le départ des convois d’enfants et de Janissaires pour Istanbul, les villageois les poursuivent et reprennent ces enfants. Il n’était cependant pas dans la mentalité de l’époque de reprendre un enfant converti à l’Islam. Les noms de baptême originaux des enfants étant ceux des saints chrétiens, selon les croyances de l’époque, un enfant dont le prénom était changé perdait la protection de son saint patron. Comme de surcroît il n’y avait alors pas de nom de famille, les enfants recevaient pour patronyme le prénom de leur père, par exemple « Sarkis, fils de Hovannes ». Les Janissaires leur attribuaient aussi des noms en fonction de leur lieu de naissance, comme « Mehmet de Filibe » (ou Abdullah, qui signifie « le serviteur d’Allah »). C’est ainsi qu’un enfant était séparé des siens.</p> <p>D’un autre côté, il y avait des avantages associés à la fonction de soldat janissaire, comme le fait d’être exempté de taxes. Nombre de Turcs souhaitaient que leurs enfants deviennent des Janissaires. Certains devshirmé pouvaient être affectés au palais et, même parfois devenir vizir. C’est ainsi que certains Turcs essayaient de faire passer leurs enfants pour Chrétiens afin qu’ils soient pris comme devshirmé. Les Albanais faisaient toutefois exception dans la mesure où ils étaient les seuls sujets musulmans à être concernés par le Devshirme. Celui-ci était effectivement utilisé par les Ottomans comme un moyen de contrôle des populations albanaises récemment islamisées, considérées représenter un intérêt stratégique pour l’Empire. Il était interdit aux Janissaires de se marier, de fonder une famille ou d’avoir une activité commerciale. Ils se mirent cependant à le faire à la fin de l’Empire ottoman. Le système du Devshirme commença aussi à tomber en désuétude, ce qui participa à la décadence de l’Empire. Les « Mühimme Defterleri » mentionnent certains cas où les recrutés retournèrent dans leur famille. Ainsi le décret d’un sultan à Sis en Cilicie en 1564 fait-il référence à des devshirmé qui se sont échappés, sont retournés dans leurs villages et ont été rebaptisés. L’Encyclopédie de l’Islam mentionne aussi le fait que des enfants plus âgés s’échappaient. Les archives Uzunçarsili et douze rapports de « Mühimme » citent le cas de devshirmé s’étant échappés après sept ans de service. Mehmet Sokullu, originaire d’une famille serbe renommée de Sokolovich entra au palais comme devshirmé et devint finalement vizir. Il désigna son frère comme leader religieux des Serbes, ce qui implique qu’il garda contact avec sa famille. Parmi les Arméniens il y a au 17ème siècle le cas des frères Mehmet Doganci et Halil Pasha. Le premier faisait partie du corps des Doganci (qui signifie « celui qui est en charge des aigles et faucons du palais ») et le second, son frère cadet, était un personnage en vue chez les Janissaires. Originaires de Malatya, ils se soutinrent mutuellement. Le Devshirme permit de pallier le manque de personnel de l’Empire ottoman, mais eut des répercussions sur les Serbes, les Grecs et les Arméniens. On ponctionna pendant des siècles nombre de garçons, et parfois de filles, parmi les plus beaux, les plus intelligents, les plus prometteurs.</p> <p>"Le Devchirmé ottoman XVI-XVII-XVIII siècles"</p> <p>Turquie News, lundi 16 juillet 2007 </p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/10/13/le_recrutement_des_janissaires_dans_l_em~3127567/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>frenchshakaryangenocideartakarmenianturkishottomandevshirmeturkeyarmeniahttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/10/13/le_recrutement_des_janissaires_dans_l_em~3127567/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/08/10/turkish_armenian_relations_in_deadlock_e~2788983/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2007-08-10:/2007/08/10/turkish_armenian_relations_in_deadlock_e~2788983/Fri, 10 Aug 2007 23:28:54 +0200 <p>Armenian expert in Turkish studies tried to assess Armenian-Turkish relations in a press conference today, four months after the murder of Hrant Dink, editor of Agos newspaper. Artak Shakaryan, an expert in Turkish studies, believes the murder was organized by nationalists and it will bring them credits during the parliamentary elections. Speaking about the demonstrations after the murder, the speakers differed in their opinion. Shakaryan believes the organizer was the Turkish government, otherwise, it would suppress the rallies. A. Hovanisyan, another expert in Turkish studies, believes that the rallies were not initiated by the government since participants made up only a minor part of Turkey with 70 million population. The rallies were an opportunity for Turkey to say it is democratic, Hovanisyan said. The Turkish expert believes Turkey allows democracy to the level it is not out of control. The speakers said the atmosphere of fear is getting worse in the country and Agos is getting letters of threats every day. The speakers said Turkish-Armenian relations are becoming very difficult if not impossible. Armenian-Turkish relations are in deadlock, Hovanisyan said. Dink used to say Turkey is more afraid of the awakening of its own people that external pressures. Today, the Turkish society is silent, they said.</p> <p>Published on May 22, 2007<br> <a href="http://www.armtown.com/news/en/prm/20070522/18267/">http://www.armtown.com/news/en/prm/20070522/18267/</a> </p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/08/10/turkish_armenian_relations_in_deadlock_e~2788983/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>artakdinkshakaryanhrantturkeyarmeniahttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/08/10/turkish_armenian_relations_in_deadlock_e~2788983/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/08/10/when_france_slaps_ankara~2788968/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2007-08-10:/2007/08/10/when_france_slaps_ankara~2788968/Fri, 10 Aug 2007 23:25:39 +0200 <p>18:37 22/05/2007<br> “The French Senate will pass the bill on Armenian Genocide the moment they decisively intend to give a slap in the Ankara’s face. Till then it will be used as a tool to pressurize Turkey”, - Artak Shakaryan, expert in Turkish studies, expressed his view at the press-conference today. </p> <p>”The last May France showed it’s ability to adopt the bill condemning Armenian Genocide, but it was postponed and passed in autumn, a better moment for putting pressure on Ankara”, – A. Shakaryan says. In his opinion the French will continue putting the bill on agenda and removing it without voting to pursue their aims.</p> <p>Source: Panorama.am</p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/08/10/when_france_slaps_ankara~2788968/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>relationsankaraturkeygenocidearmeniashakaryanartakfrancehttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/08/10/when_france_slaps_ankara~2788968/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/06/19/study_sheds_new_light_on_ottoman_blood_t~2479477/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2007-06-19:/2007/06/19/study_sheds_new_light_on_ottoman_blood_t~2479477/Tue, 19 Jun 2007 10:38:48 +0200 <p>Becoming a devshirme was not like winning a Harvard scholarship”<br> by Talin Suciyan . . </p> <p>YEREVAN – Artak Shakaryan, 27, is a Turkish studies scholar at Armenia’s Academy of Sciences. Mr. Shakaryan is fluent in Turkish and reads Ottoman. He completed his Ph.D. dissertation last year and published it as a book, Devshirme: Blood Tax in the Ottoman Empire. The book is in Armenian with an English language summary in the back, and it focuses on the Ottoman system of recruitment of children from subject non-Muslim communities.</p> <p>Question: How did you decide to focus on Turkey? Shakaryan: That was not my intention initially. I was interested in history and languages. I wanted to study the Middle East. Arab studies in Armenia are very fashionable. So, I too, wanted to study the Arab world. But that did not work out and instead I enrolled in Turkish studies. But now I am very happy to have done that.</p> <p>Q: How did you arrive at the subject of devshirme for your dissertation? Shakaryan: I was interested in medieval Ottoman history and was looking for a less-studied subject. In the process, I came across the subject of devshirme and my adviser, who is also the head of Turkish studies at the Academy, Dr. Ruben Safrastyan, encouraged me to work on that issue. Until then, there was only one article written by an Armenian scholar on that subject.</p> <p>Q: In your book, there are criticisms of historians like Stanford Shaw and Halil İnalcik. Can you explain the reasons? Shakaryan: Becoming a devshirme was not like winning a Harvard scholarship. By and large, it was not such a great or even a good thing.</p> <p>Q: Did those authors present devshirme as a positive institution, providing its recruits with good opportunities? Shakaryan: Both İnalcik and Shaw have made that argument. According to them, the institution of devshirme provided a “chance to the son of a shepherd to become a vizier.” But that was an extremely rare occurrence. The majority of devshirme children were either sold as slaves or became “yenicheri” soldiers to fight in wars. The arguments of Inalcik and Shaw can be found in their respective books, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914 (with Donald Quataert, 1994) and Histo- ry of the Ottoman Empire and Mod- ern Turkey (with Ezel Kural Shaw, 1978).</p> <p>Q: How did the devshirme system work? Shakaryan: Yenicheri soldiers together with doctors would come to rural settlements and would draft recruits from among children six to sixteen years of age. The age range was so big because physical appearance was more important than the actual age. A devshirme child had to be healthy, not too tall or too short and not too fat or too thin. Children already engaged to be married would not be recruited. It was in part for this reason that so many families would get their children engaged at very early ages. Another important rule was that the children should not be able to speak Turkish. Children who were collected and brought to Istanbul would be shown to “experts” who based primarily on their physical characteristics would suggest in which realm they would be most useful. There were verbal tests too. The best looking and smartest were sent to the palace; others were sent to the yenicheri to be soldiers; and the rest would be sold as slaves.</p> <p>Q: Are there any estimates on what share of these chosen children were going to the palace, or becoming soldiers or slaves? Shakaryan: Exact statistics have not been available. But from available sources one can approximate that 60 per cent would be enslaved, 30 percent become yenicheri, and the remaining 10 percent would end up at the palace.</p> <p>Q: With which sources did you work? Shakaryan: I studied the “muhimme” notebooks in Damascus. They provided the backbone for my study. In addition, there are “fermans” (orders) of the sultan that are available, where you can find orders concerning the devshirme.</p> <p>Q: Why did the state feel that this institution was needed? Shakaryan: Soon after its establishment, the Ottoman state had expanded very quickly and it did not have enough personnel. Therefore, at first a system was introduced to recruit Christians as paid mercenary soldiers.</p> <p>Q: Was not this practiced by the Byzantines as well? Shakaryan: There are quite a few historians who think that the Ottoman state adopted that system from the Byzantines. A devshirme-like system also existed among Arabs. But Arabs would recruit not from among their own subjects, but from among slaves and enemy soldiers taken as prisoners. Collecting children as tax from their own subjects was first introduced by the Ottoman state and the main reason was the shortage of personnel. Prior to that there was already the custom known as “pencik”. This was part of the sultan’s army that consisted of every one of five captured enemy soldiers. In the 16th century the empire’s expansion slowed down. Consequently, the number of pencik available also decreased. In order to create new resources the system of devshirme was introduced.</p> <p>Q: Why were only Christians drafted? Shakaryan: If Muslims were also included they might have had powerful parents or acquaintances, and many of them spoke Turkish. There are also records prohibiting drafting from among the Jews and Roma. No specific reasons are stated, but there was also a rule that children should not come from the cities and most Jews lived in cities. The argument was that city children were smarter and could escape more easily.</p> <p>Q: Were there any regional privileges? Shakaryan: Most devshirme are known to have come from the European parts of the empire, from Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and other Slavic areas. At the time, the empire was trying to spread westward. For this reason, some scholars suggested that Armenians may not have been included in the devshirme system. But from the 15th century you can see that even from Kutahya, Armenians were taken as devshirme. Later, when the Ottomans consolidated their control of the eastern provinces, more Armenians were drafted.</p> <p>Q: Did the family factor play any role? Shakaryan: It did. The state favored taking the kids of religious and feudal leaders. This was well thought out. These were the leaders of their respective communities. And by taking their children, they left them with no immediate successors. In that period there were no universities in the empire, so professions would typically pass on from fathers to sons. Thus, a son of a shepherd would probably become a shepherd. And if you take a son of a religious leader, that village could be soon left without a religious leader [and disintegrate].</p> <p>Q: But a local leader could probably bribe the authorities or find another way to keep his son. Shakaryan: There have been such cases. But most Armenians in that period were not very rich. (The rich ones were mostly Muslims.) [If they knew in advance of the draft], they would sometimes send their children away and try to cheat the officials. But the Ottoman officials, the yenicheri, could check the local baptismal records.</p> <p>Q: Was there any resistance? Shakaryan: There was. When the yenicheri would arrive, the locals would alert neighboring villages that they were coming. Or once the children were collected and start the journey to Istanbul, villagers sometimes raided the yenicheri groups and took their children back.</p> <p>But in the popular mindset of those times, once a child became Muslim, his family would not take him back. The children’s original names were related to Christian saints, and once changed, according to beliefs of the time, they lost the protection of the saint. And since there were no surnames at that time, children would also be called by their father’s name. Sarkis, the son of Hovannes, for instance. Yenicheri would give them names related to their birth place, such as Mehmet from Filibe or Abdullah, meaning servant of Allah. A child would thus be separated from his kin.</p> <p>If you are taken from home at the age of seven, your religion, name and environment are changed, you in fact become rootless [and a different person].</p> <p>On the other hand, to become a yenicheri soldier had its benefits, like exemption from taxes. Many Turks wanted their children to become yenicheri. Some devshirme could even enter the palace and, on rare occasions, even become vizier. So some Turks tried to pretend that their children were Christians and to have them qualify as devshirme and some historians use this point to argue how attractive the system was.</p> <p>Among Muslims, Albanians were an exception in that they too were drafted as devshirme. Since they were newly Islamized, devshirme was used as a control mechanism among Albanians since they were seen as strategically important for the Ottomans.</p> <p>For yenicheri it was prohibited to get married, to have a family or engage in trade. But toward the end of the Ottoman Empire, they began doing all of that. And as the devshirme system began to fall apart, that coincided with the unraveling of the empire itself.</p> <p>Q: Were any girls taken? Shakaryan: There is not much information on that. In the 17th century that was done, mostly by Persians. At the Matenataran in Yerevan, there are several records stating that “Ottoman officers came and collected good-looking girls.”</p> <p>Q: And what was their role? Shakaryan: Girls were used both in the palace and [as concubines] by the yenicheri. Some girls were sent to the sultan’s harem; later on some would be married to yenicheri, at least those who ended up away from Istanbul.</p> <p>Q: Were there any accounts of these children going back to their families or families trying to trace their children? Shakaryan: There are records in “muhimme defterleri”. For instance, there is a sultan’s order from 1564 in Sis in Cilicia that mentioned devshirme who escaped, went back to their villages and were rebaptized. In the Ency- clopedia of Islam, there is a mention that older children would escape. Both in Uzunçarşılı’s records and in twelve numbered “muhimme” records there is information about devshirme who escaped after having served seven years. If devshirme was indeed like a Harvard scholarship, these children would not have escaped.</p> <p>Q: Were there older devshirme who kept relations with their families? Shakaryan: The best example was Mehmet Sokullu. He was from a renowned Serb family of Sokolovich. He entered the palace as devshirme, and eventually became vizier. He appointed his brother as the Serbs’ religious leader, which implies that he kept in touch with his family.</p> <p>Among Armenians, there is Halil Pasha and Mehmet Doğancı (“doğancı” means the one who takes care of hawks of the palace). Mehmet was among the doğanci and his younger brother Halil Pasha was a very prominent name among yenicheri in the 17th century. They were from Malatya and they supported each other. There are few examples like this.</p> <p>Q: What impact did this system have on the communities? Shakaryan: Devshirme as a system met the need for personnel in the empire, but it had very negative repercussions for Slavs, Greeks, and Armenians. Many of the smartest, the best-looking, the most intelligent boys and sometimes girls could not enrich their own communities for centuries. This resulted in genetic differences and undermined the richness of those groups. Of course, over time the situation improved.</p> <p>Armenian Reporter<br> June 2, 2007</p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/06/19/study_sheds_new_light_on_ottoman_blood_t~2479477/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>ottomanshakaryanacademydevshirmearmeniaartakturkeyhttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2007/06/19/study_sheds_new_light_on_ottoman_blood_t~2479477/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/04/07/on_turkey_s_nuclear_program~710106/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2006-04-07:/2006/04/07/on_turkey_s_nuclear_program~710106/Fri, 07 Apr 2006 15:05:45 +0200 <p><strong>Artak Shakaryan </strong></p> <p>Turkey talks about the development of nuclear energy began in 1953, after the well known speech of Eisenhower “Atoms for peace” in UN General Assembly. However, Turkey’s de facto inclusion into the field of nuclear energy dates back in May, 1955, when Ankara signed a unilateral agreement with Washington on “peaceful use of nuclear energy”. In 1959 began the construction of Turkey’s first nuclear reactor, which was set in Nuclear Research and Training Center in Cekmece for mere research purposes.<br> <a href="http://www.blog.co.uk/srv/media/media_item.php?item_ID=465260"><img src="http://data1.blog.de/media/260/465260_45cf9b9e8a_s.jpg" align="" alt="362_1261927_powerstation300" vspace="5" hspace="5"></a><br> From that day on the special term on building nuclear stations has been included in every five-year plan by State planning organization. </p> <p>In 1970 the consulting group arrived from the USA and Spain to Turkey suggested constructing CANDU rector with 400 MW /CANadian Deuterium Uranium reactor-a Canadian rector, which is “convenient for nuclear weapon proliferation”. As a rule this reactor, which uses heavy water as a reducer, produces more plutonium/. It was planned to set the station working in 1977, however, the military coup in March 1971 put off the projects. In 1976 Turkish Atomic Energy Council /TAEC/ endowed to begin the constriction of the Atomic power station in the place called Akkuyu. In 1977 negotiations began between two Swedish companies on building a 660 MW boiling water reactor. But this time also the military coup in 1980 put an end to Turkey’s second attempt to build a nuclear electric power station. </p> <p>In 1983 TAEC announced a competition among international companies which sell reactors. The outcome of the competition was the agreement on nuclear cooperation between Turkey and Canada signed in 1985. However in 1986 it became known that the carrying out of the project was cancelled because of financial disagreements.</p> <p>After the above mentioned failures Turkey turned to Argentina. In May 1988 the two states signed an agreement on 15 years term cooperation. Turkey hoped to duplicate the independent course of nuclear fuel cycle from Argentina. Turkey was also interested in a 25 MW light water reactor called CAREM-25. In October 1990 an agreement was reached to build two reactors of Carem-25 kind, one for each country. The former director of TAEC Yalchin Sanalan was honest enough to announce that CAREM-25 <strong>“…was very little for producing electric power and very big to use it for research works, but it is very convenient for producing plutonium”.</strong> Thus Turkey was under the threat of nuclear proliferation. Under the pressure of the US and other states Turkey denounced the project in 1991. </p> <p>The next attempt of Turkey to resume this project was in October 1992, when Turkish Atomic Energy Council sent the announcement of preliminary suggestions. The competition was announced in December 1996. Three consortiums took part in the competition- AECL, Westnighouse/Mitsubishi և Framatome/Siemens. </p> <p>Official Ankara announced that the preliminary exclusion of France-German consortium Framatome/Siemens from the competition was under discussion because of the decision of French Parliament on the Armenian Genocide. Germany’s opposition on Turkey’s membership to the EU also weakened the position of this consortium. In answer to the freezing of Turkish-EU relations, official Ankara gave the American consortium of Westinghouse/Mitsubishi a chance to fortify its position. </p> <p>In 1997-1999 inner political situation in Turkey was quite unsteady. The final decision of the competition was being delayed all the time, and in August 1999 devastating earthquake struck the area of Izmit, causing death of 18000 people and deepening the situation of crisis. </p> <p>In July 2000 at the governmental sitting a decision was made to put off the project of Akkuyu. It became clear from the government’s announcement that the decision on delay was not conditioned by security issues, but it was also clearly worded that the delay didn’t mean rejection of the project. Turkey’s nuclear program was put off till the better times; however, it was still considered a strategic direction and research works were not ceased. </p> <p>* * *</p> <p>In 2005-2006, under international tension connected with Iranian nuclear programs, Turkey again pushed its dossier into the foreground. </p> <p>In 2005, as a result of USA-Iran strained relations, Washington took serious steps towards planning possible attack on Iran. Again Ankara’s support was needed. In December 2005 the US FBI director Robert Muller opened Washington-Ankara “traffic” by his visit to Ankara. Later on a visit was paid by CIA director Porter Goss, who first had a meeting with the director of Turkish National Intelligence organization Emre Taneri and later on with Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan. After Goss a visit was paid to Turkey by the secretary general of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice.</p> <p>In the middle of December an almost parallel return visit was paid by the commander of Turkey’s land forces Yasar Buyukanit who is to become the chairman of Turkey’s Joint Chiefs of Staff this year. The latter met the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, the commander of land forces Peter Shomaker and the US deputy secretary of defense, US former ambassador to Ankara Eric Edelman. In February 2006, secretary-general of Turkey’s National Security Council Yigit Alpogan paid a visit to Washington and had a meeting with the state secretary Rice and the defense deputy minister Edelman.</p> <p>In this context it is quite noteworthy the visit of Hilmi Guler, Turkey’s minister of energy and natural resources, to the USA in February 2006. He had meetings with the US energy minister Samuel Bodman and State department’s senior officials in the field of economy and energy. Besides, he paid a special visit to “North Anna” nuclear station in the state of Virginia. At the end of the visit we get some interesting information concerning to his mission from the press conference held by Guler. According to him Turkey also plans to expend energetic sources, reduce dependence on oil and more concentrate on inland sources /as George W. Bush characterized it in his speech on January 31, 2006/. As Guler pointed out, till 2020 Turkey plans to cover 10% of the expenses of about 54000 MW investment project on behalf of nuclear energy. Washington suggested Turkey to built nuclear stations equipped with the latest technological innovations. The US energy deputy minister Clay Sell particularly announced that “Turkey is a kind of classical country opportune to cooperate with”. According to Sell the US also envisages to satisfy fuel demands of any country desiring to build nuclear stations. </p> <p>In March 2006 together with announcing about the envisaged construction of 3 nuclear stations Guler also pointed out their places-Sinop, Mersin Akkuyu and Mughla /three of them are in the western part of Turkey/. In March Turkey’s foreign minister Gule had a meeting with IAEA president Mohamed El Baradei and asked for his support in Turkey’s nuclear program the official announcement of which will be made in June. </p> <p>* * *</p> <p>Thus, Turkey’s nuclear program, originated from the speech of the US president Eisenhower “Atoms for peace”, now gathered a new speed by the speech of George W. Bush, who claimed to more concentrate on alternative energy sources, particularly on nuclear energy, to weaken oil dependence of his country.</p> <p>What will be Turkey’s position pretending on the role of an leader in the Middle East if Iran appears as a de facto nuclear state against Israel. Whether Ankara, officially appearing in favor of non-proliferation, will be able to refrain from that temptation. It’s already half a century that Ankara develops its nuclear potential and has quite a big scientific-technical potential. Each unsuccessful attempt drew it closer to its goal. For Ankara nuclear energy has always been of primary importance and its outward suspending didn’t suppose the hold up of its backstage work. Turkey is just waiting for convenient international situation to announce about its nuclear pretentiousness all over the world. </p> <p><a href="http://www.noravank.am/?l=3&d=27&f=362">http://www.noravank.am/?l=3&d=27&f=362</a> </p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/04/07/on_turkey_s_nuclear_program~710106/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>turkeyarmeniaartakshakaryannuclearatomichttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/04/07/on_turkey_s_nuclear_program~710106/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/04/07/a_1042_a_1086_a_1082_a_1088_a_1091_a_107~710091/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2006-04-07:/2006/04/07/a_1042_a_1086_a_1082_a_1088_a_1091_a_107~710091/Fri, 07 Apr 2006 15:00:26 +0200 <p><strong>Артак Шакарян </strong></p> <p>Разговоры о развитии ядерной энергии начались в Турции в 1953г., после известного выступления Эйзенхауэра «Атом во имя мира» на Генеральной ассамблее ООН. Однако фактическое вовлечение Турции в сферу ядерной энергии началось в 1955г., когда Анкара подписала с Вашингтоном двусторонний договор о сотрудничестве в области «мирного использования атомной энергии». В 1959г. в Турции началось строительство первого ядерного реактора, который разместился в чекмедженском исследовательском центре ядерных исследований и служил исключительно исследовательским целям.</p> <p>С этого дня пункт о строительстве атомных станций включается во все пятилетние планы Организации государственного планирования Турции. </p> <p>В 1970г., по совету прибывшей из США и Испании консультационной группы, Турции было предложено построить реактор CANDU /CANadian Deuterium Uranium reactor – Канадский реактор, «удобный для распространения ядерного оружия»: как правило, в этом реакторе, где тяжелая вода используется в качестве замедлителя, производится больше плутония/ мощностью 400 мвт. Станцию планировалось запустить уже в 1977г., однако военный переворот в марте 1971г. отсрочил реализацию этих программ. В 1976г. Турецкое агентство по атомной энергии /ТААЭ/ позволило приступить к работе по строительству атомной станции в местечке Аккую. В 1977г. начались переговоры с двумя шведскими компаниями о строительстве работающего на кипящей воде реактора мощностью 660 мвт. Однако на этот раз военный переворот 1980г. поставил точку во второй попытке строительства атомной электростанции в Турции. </p> <p>В 1983г. ТААЭ объявило конкурс между торгующими реакторами международными компаниями. В результате конкурса в 1985г. Канада и Турция подписали Договор об атомном сотрудничестве. Однако в 1986г. выяснилось, что реализация программы откладывается из-за финансовых споров.</p> <p>После этой неудачи Турция обратилась к Аргентине. В мае 1988г. две страны пописали договор об атомном сотрудничестве сроком на 15 лет. Турция надеялась повторить аргентинский процесс независимого цикла ядерного топлива. Турция была также заинтересована в аргентинском реакторе на легкой воде CAREM-25. В октябре 1990г. была достигнута договоренность о строительстве двух реакторов типа CAREM-25 – по одному реактору в каждой стране. Бывший директор ТААЭ Ялчин Саналан признался, что CAREM-25 «...очень мал для производства электроэнергии и слишком велик с точки зрения использования в исследовательских или учебных целях, однако очень удобен для производства плутония». Таким образом, возникала угроза распространения ядерного оружия в Турции. Под давлением США и других стран Турция в 1991г. аннулировала этот проект.</p> <p>Очередная попытка Турции начать программу по ядерной энергии имела место в октябре 1992г., когда Турецкий совет по электроэнергии послал декларацию о предварительных предложениях. Конкурс на строительство реактора в Аккую был объявлен в декабре 1996г. В конкурсе принимали участие три консорциума: AECL, Westnighouse/Mitsubishi и Framatome/Siemens.</p> <p>В связи с проектом решения сената Франции о признании Геноцида армян официальная Анкара заявила, что надлежит обсудить вопрос о досрочном лишении франко-германского консорциума Framatome/Siemens права на участие в конкурсе. Противодействие Германии вступлению Турции в ЕС также усложняет положение консорциума. В ответ на замораживание отношений Турция – Евросоюз официальная Анкара предоставила американскому консорциуму Westinghouse/Mitsubishi возможность упрочить свои позиции.</p> <p>В 1997-1999 гг. внутриполитическая ситуация в Турции была довольно нестабильной. Подведение окончательных итогов конкурса постоянно затягивалось, а произошедшее в августе 1999г. землетрясение в Измире, ставшее причиной гибели 18000 человек, еще более углубило кризисную ситуацию.</p> <p>На состоявшемся в июле 2000г. заседании правительства было решено отсрочить проект Аккую. Из заявления правительства стало ясно, что решение об отсрочке не было вызвано вопросами безопасности, однако в нем четко заявлялось, что отсрочка вовсе не означает отказа от проекта. Ядерные программы Турции отложены до лучших времен, однако продолжают считаться стратегическим направлением, и исследовательские работы по ним не прекращены.</p> <p> * * *</p> <p>В 2005-2006 гг., в условиях разработки ядерной программы Ирана и связанной с ней напряженности в международных отношениях, Турция вновь вытащила из запасников свои ядерные программы и приступила к делу.</p> <p>В конце 2005г. обострившиеся отношения США – Иран привели к тому, что в Вашингтоне всерьез начали готовиться к разработке планов нападения на Иран. Вновь возникла необходимость в поддержке Анкары. В декабре 2005г. «маршрут» Вашингтон – Анкара был открыт визитом главы Федерального бюро расследований США Роберта Мюллера. Затем визит в Анкару нанес глава ЦРУ Портер Гос, который также встретился с одним из руководителей турецкой внешней разведки Эмре Танером и премьер-министром Турции Эрдоганом. Уже после Госа Анкару посетил генеральный секретарь НАТО Яап де Хооп Схеффер, а также госсекретарь США К.Райс.</p> <p>Практически параллельно – в середине декабря, состоялся ответный визит командующего сухопутными войсками Турции Яшара Бююканта, который, кстати, в этом году станет главой Генштаба Турции. Бююкант встретился с начальником Генштаба США, генералом Питером Пейсом, командующим сухопутными войсками Питером Шумейхером и замминистра обороны США, экс-послом США в Анкаре Эриком Эделманом. В январе 2006г. визит в Вашингтон нанес генеральный секретарь Совета национальной безопасности Турции Йигит Альпоган, который встретился с госсекретарем США К.Райс и замминистра обороны США Эриком Эделманом.</p> <p>В этом контексте довольно знаменателен прошедший в феврале 2006г. визит в США министра энергетики и природных ресурсов Турции Хилми Гюлера. Он провел ряд встреч с министром энергетики США Семюелем Бодманом, специализирующимися по энергетике и экономике сотрудниками Госпдепа. Кроме того, он нанес специальный визит на атомную станцию North Anna, штат Вирджиния. Из последовавшей за визитом пресс-конференции Гюлера можно почерпнуть довольно интересные сведения относительно его миссии. По словам Гюлера, Турция также планирует разнообразить свои энергоисточники, уменьшить зависимость от нефти и «обратить взор к внутренним ресурсам» /как охарактеризовал этот процесс президент США Дж.Буш-младший в своем выступлении от 31 января 2006г./. Согласно Гюлеру, Турция планирует до 2020г. покрыть примерно 10% 54000-мегаватной инвестиционной программы за счет атомной энергии. В Вашингтоне Турции предложили построить атомные станции, оснащенные последними технологическими изобретениями. В частности, замминистра энергетики США Клей Сел заявил, что «Турция – классический пример страны, с которой мы считаем целесообразным сотрудничать». По словам Села, США собираются удовлетворить также спрос на ядерное топливо других стран, желающих построить атомные станции.</p> <p>Уже в марте 2006г. Гюлер не только заявил, что планируется построить 3 атомные станции, но и отметил места их возведения: Синоп, Мерсин-Аккую и Мухла /все три пункта находятся в западных районах Турции/. Министр иностранных дел Турции Гюль в марте с.г. провел встречу с председателем МАГАТЭ Мохамедом Эль Барадеи, в ходе которой обратился за содействием в вопросе ядерных программ Турции и отметил, что официальное заявление по этому поводу будет сделано в июне.</p> <p> * * *</p> <p>Таким образом, атомные программы Турции стартовали с выступления президента США Эйзенхауэра «Атом во имя мира» и сегодня получили новые импульс после выступления президента Буша-младшего, который, чтобы ослабить зависимость своей страны от нефти, призвал приглядеться к альтернативным источникам энергии, в частности, к атомной энергии.</p> <p>Какова будет позиция Турции, претендующей на роль ближневосточного лидера, если против Израиля в качестве фактического единодержавного ядерного государства в регионе выступит Иран? Сможет ли Анкара, официально выступающая против распространения ядерного оружия, удержаться от этого соблазна? Анкара уже полвека занимается проблемами развития своего ядерного потенциала и обладает достаточно мощным научно-техническим потенциалом. Неудачные попытки с каждым разом еще больше приближали Турцию к ее цели. Атомная энергия всегда входила в число приоритетов Анкары, и показное прекращение программ не предполагало остановки закулисной работы. Турция просто выжидает удобного международного положения, чтобы объявить миру о своих ядерных притязаниях.</p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/04/07/a_1042_a_1086_a_1082_a_1088_a_1091_a_107~710091/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/04/07/a_1042_a_1086_a_1082_a_1088_a_1091_a_107~710091/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/03/17/a_1055_a_1086_a_1076_a_1074_a_1077_a_107~650803/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2006-03-17:/2006/03/17/a_1055_a_1086_a_1076_a_1074_a_1077_a_107~650803/Fri, 17 Mar 2006 07:37:00 +0100 <p>В пресс-центре Южнокавказского филиала Фонда развития "Кавказский институт демократии" 16 марта состоялось подведение итогов конкурса среди экспертов и аналитиков Армении, занимающихся изучением современных российско-армянских отношений, процессов политического развития и интеграции в регионах Южного Кавказа, Ближнего Востока, СНГ и проблем разрешения региональных конфликтов.</p> <p>Как сообщает корреспондент ИА REGNUM в Ереване, члены жюри огласили имена победителей, которым были вручены грамоты и денежные призы. В частности, победителем конкурса был признан Ваагн Аглян, который представил работу "Российская Федерация и Южный Кавказ: структурная взаимосвязанность и перспективы развития отношений". Ему был вручен денежный приз в размере 300 тысяч драмов. <strong>Второе место </strong>заняли сразу два аналитика - <strong>Артак Шакарян</strong> за анализ процесса членства Турции в ЕС и Арутюн Хачатрян за материал "Армения - потенциал экономического роста на ближайшие годы". Им были вручены денежные призы в размере 200 тысяч драмов. Третье место и по 150 тысяч драмов жюри присудило Сергею Шакарянцу за конкурсную работу "Косово и Арцах!? Ненадлежащий прецедент", Гайку Демояну - "Исламские наемники в карабахской войне: к истокам проникновения сети международного терроризма в Азербайджане и Турции" и Сергею Минасяну - "Военно-технические аспекты региональной безопасности и проблемы контроля над вооружениями на Южном Кавказе". Поощрительные призы в размере 50 тысяч драмов были вручены Гранту Тер-Абраамяну за материал "Динамика политической ситуации в Исламской Республике Иран и вокруг него", Левону Казаряну за материал "Иран и Уран: вызовы для Армении" и Аршаку Оганяну, который попытался проанализировать современные мировые и региональные политические процессы.</p> <p>Генеральный директор Южнокавказского филиала Фонда развития "Кавказский институт демократии" Арменика Кивирян выразила надежду на то, что проведение такого конкурса станет традиционным. В свою очередь, руководитель научно-образовательного фонда "Нораванк" Гагик Арутюнян отметил, что главным положительным итогом конкурса стал вклад в становление и развитие аналитического сообщества Армении. В состав жюри также входили Рубен Сафрастян - профессор, заведующий отделом Турции Института востоковедения НАН РА, Севак Саруханян - замдиректора научно-образовательного фонда "Нораванк" и Мушег Лалаян - заместитель председателя Республиканской партии, главный редактор аналитического журнала "Анрапетакан". Работы на оценку жюри представлялись в анонимном режиме, что способствовало объективности итоговых результатов.</p> <p>Постоянный адрес новости: <a href="http://www.regnum.ru/news/607256.html">www.regnum.ru/news/607256.html</a><br> 13:47 16.03.2006</p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/03/17/a_1055_a_1086_a_1076_a_1074_a_1077_a_107~650803/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/03/17/a_1055_a_1086_a_1076_a_1074_a_1077_a_107~650803/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/03/13/a_1042_a_1086_a_1082_a_1088_a_1091_a_107~639600/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2006-03-13:/2006/03/13/a_1042_a_1086_a_1082_a_1088_a_1091_a_107~639600/Mon, 13 Mar 2006 16:21:01 +0100 <p>Отношения Турция–ЕС были кризисными всегда: почти все шаги Анкары были сопряжены с большими сложностями.<br> <a href="http://www.blog.co.uk/srv/media/media_item.php?item_ID=416605"><img src="http://data1.blog.de/media/605/416605_ce7d7a23e7_s.jpg" align="" alt="303_shaqaryan_artak_250x250" vspace="5" hspace="5"></a><br> Когда в 1987г. премьер Турции Тургут Озал официально обратился в ЕС с заявкой на полноправное членство, Турция виделась очень далекой страной, абсолютно не готовой к вступлению ни по экономическим, ни по копенгагенским политическим критериям. Одновременно Европа взялась показать Анкаре, что путь будет не столь легким: 18 июня того же 1987 года Европарламент принял решение, которым признал Геноцид армян в Османской империи и призвал Евросоюз оказать давление на Турцию. </p> <p>И все же, через два года – в 1989 году, Турция начала подготовительный процесс. В 1995г. Турция обратилась в ЕС для членства в Таможенном союзе, и вновь внутри ЕС возник серьезный спор. Наиболее проблематичной для Турции могла стать позиция официальных Афин, однако Греция не воспользовалась своим правом на вето, получив взамен согласие членов ЕС начать процесс членства Кипра. </p> <p>На саммите в 1997г. в Люксембурге Турция потребовала, чтобы ей присвоили статус «страны-кандидата в полноправное членство», в чем ей, в результате долгих обсуждений, было отказано, т.к. Турция еще никак не сообразовала свое внутреннее законодательство с копенгагенскими критериями. </p> <p>Широкомасштабная лоббистская деятельность США принесла плоды, и на Хельсинкском 1999г. заявление Турции вновь было представлено к обсуждению. Важным в изменении отношения к Турции было и то, что на прошедших в Германии выборах христианские демократы, высказывающиеся против членства Турции, потерпели поражение, а победили социал-демократы, поддерживающие в этом вопросе Анкару. Турции был присвоен статус страны-кандидата. </p> <p>Т.к. к 2002г. Анкара еще недостаточно сообразовала свою политическую систему с критериями ЕС, на саммите в Копенгагене европейские страны отказались сообщить Турции дату начала переговоров о полноправном членстве. </p> <p>Партия «Справедливость и прогресс», пришедшая к власти в Турции в результате парламентских выборов 2002г., получила абсолютное большинство в Великом Национальном Собрании Турции. Посему в кратчайшие сроки были приняты почти все законопроекты по преобразованиям, которые требовались со стороны ЕС. В документальном плане большая часть копенгагенских критериев была обеспечена. Хотя в ЕС с подозрением отнеслись к претворению этих наспех принятых законов, однако это посчитали вопросом будущего. </p> <p>На Брюссельском саммите 17 декабря 2004г. выявилось, что для многих европейских стран вопрос членства Турции стал одной из внутриполитических проблем. Кроме того, Кипр, уже ставший полноправным членом Евросоюза, потребовал, чтобы Турция признала его независимость. Турция же, являясь членом Таможенного союза, должна была подписать с новыми членами, в том числе и с Кипром, дополнительный договор, что означало бы фактическое признание этой страны, и чего избегала Турция. Решение вопроса было отложено, и началом переговоров было обозначено 3 октября 2005г. </p> <p>В этот день 2005 года страны-члены ЕС в Люксембурге после долгих обсуждений приняли решение начать переговоры с Турцией. Как сказал министр иностранных дел Турции Абдулла Гюль: «3 октября 2005 года Турция успела сесть в отбывающий поезд». Ситуация, однако, этим не проясняется, т.к. европейские политические деятели оставили себе возможность отступления и не определили окончательный срок переговорного процесса с Турцией. То есть, даже если Анкара «успела на поезд», никто не гарантирует, что к 2015-2020 годам этот поезд довезет ее до заветной станции. </p> <p>Плотная населенность Турции, печальное состояние экономики, политическая нестабильность, низкий уровень демократии – лишь начало того объемистого списка, из-за которого Анкара является нежелательным партнером для стран Евросоюза. Против полноправного членства Турции выступают преимущественно те страны, которые уже имеют многочисленное исламское население, эмигрировавшее, в частности, из Турции. Прибавляет озабоченности то, что членство Турции поддерживается Соединенными Штатами Америки. Со своим 70-миллионным населением Турция займет важное место в механизме принятия решений Евросоюза, и у ЕС имеются серьезные опасения, что Анкара явится «троянским конем» Вашингтона. </p> <p>Евросоюз в целом, и в частности Франция и Германия, для замедления продвижения Турции используют множество средств, в том числе разыгрывая вопрос признания Геноцида армян. Франция и Германия, как и некоторые европейские страны, лишь недавно в той или иной формулировке официально признали факт Геноцида армян и сейчас непрестанно требуют у Турции сделать то же самое. Хотя признание Геноцида армян, как и снятие блокады Республики Армения, не находятся в списке требований ЕС, однако остаются в арсенале европейцев и при необходимости будут вновь задействованы для оказания давления на Анкару, как это было сделано накануне 3 октября, когда 28 сентября ЕС принял решение, которым призвал Анкару признать Геноцид армян начала ХХ века. </p> <p>Тем не менее, 3 октября показало, что европейские страны вовсе не едины в своей внешней политике и по возможности продвигают свои узкие интересы и ведут «собственную игру». Яркий пример тому Австрия, которая приняла жесткую позицию на встречах о начале переговоров с Турцией и притормозила переговорный процесс. В результате такого подхода Вена смогла ввести в переговорный этап и свою протеже – единоверную /католическую/ Хорватию. </p> <p>* * *</p> <p>С 1 января 2006г. председательство в ЕС перешло к Австрии. Представитель Австрии уже заявил, что «для Турции настало время проявить добрую волю, чтобы облегчить свой путь в ЕС». Речь идет о признании Турцией Кипра. Жесткая позиция Турции тормозит продвижение европейской политики, в частности переговоры ЕС–НАТО. Анкара отказывается сесть за стол переговоров с Кипром, по отношению к чему европейцы уже выказывают свою нетерпимость. </p> <p>Проблема признания Кипра обострится во время предстоящих в начале 2006г. турецко-европейских переговоров, т.к. турецкие порты до сих пор закрыты перед киприотами. Таким образом, давление на Анкару в ближайшие месяцы усилится. В общем, можно утверждать, что в турецко-европейских отношениях вопрос Кипра будет той миной, которая взорвется при ошибочных шагах Анкары. </p> <p>Выдвигаемые перед Турцией задания не ограничиваются Кипром. После 3 октября Еврокомиссия предъявила Турции список, состоящий из 150 требований, без выполнения которых Турция не может надеяться на полноправное членство. Требования имеют строгий характер и конечный срок – 2 года. Согласно требованиям этого документа - к концу 2007г. Турция должна отказаться от смертной казни, установить свободу совести, гражданский контроль над военными, систему независимых судов и т.д. В этом плане перед сложной задачей стоит военная верхушка, которая в стране всегда была сторонницей светского пути и европеизации. Хотя сейчас европейские преобразования ведут Турцию на Запад, однако, с одной стороны, стремятся свести к минимуму контроль военных, с другой – предоставляют широкую свободу действий исламистам и курдам. </p> <p>В подтверждение вышесказанного: в известном журнале «Foreign Affairs» недавно была опубликована статья, выражающая официальное мнение вооруженных сил Турции /ТВС/ по вопросам турецко-европейских отношений. Статья озаглавлена «Марш турецкой армии в Европу» и имеет весьма серьезное и важное значение, учитывая и место публикации, и подписи. </p> <p>Хотя в статье подчеркивается, что ТВС выступают за ЕС, не чинят препятствий европейскому продвижению Турции и это решение получило одобрение главы Генштаба Турции, однако также отмечается, что:</p> <p>ожиданием ТВС является полноправное членство Турции: при ином результате существующие проблемы только усугубятся;<br> имеющиеся в данном процессе вызовы – признание Кипра, усиление исламистов и сепаратизм курдов – будут болезненными еще долгое время;<br> если процесс ослабления ТВС продолжится, а курдские сепаратисты, исламисты попытаются заполнить образовавшуюся пустоту, то армия прекратит поддержку европейских преобразований.<br> И впрямь, можно ожидать, что в будущем проблема, связанная с курдами, также получит широкую огласку. Министр иностранных дел Турции Абдулла Гюль неоднократно подчеркивал, что «Турция не собирается принять определение «о новых национальных меньшинствах» и при включении этого пункта в переговорные документы Анкара откажется участвовать в переговорном процессе». Очевидно, что перспектива создания независимого Курдистана в Северном Ираке, в совокупности со свободой слова, независимыми судами и более пристальным вниманием Европы к Турции, позволит курдам проявить большую активность и затруднит их отстранение от процесса принятия решений в самой Турции. </p> <p>Таким образом, можно резюмировать, что Турция еще далека от полноправного членства в ЕС. Начало переговоров вовсе не означает победу Анкары в этом вопросе, а сам процесс полон проблем, кризисных ситуаций, имеющих тенденцию к еще большему обострению. Турция будет стремиться ценой минимальных уступок максимально приблизиться к статусу членства, а ЕС, выдвигая все новые условия, отсрочить полноправное членство. </p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/03/13/a_1042_a_1086_a_1082_a_1088_a_1091_a_107~639600/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/03/13/a_1042_a_1086_a_1082_a_1088_a_1091_a_107~639600/#commentshttp://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/03/13/turkish_syrian_relationships~639590/tag:sugartak.blog.co.uk,2006-03-13:/2006/03/13/turkish_syrian_relationships~639590/Mon, 13 Mar 2006 16:17:42 +0100 <p>The new stage of Turkish-Syrian relationships began in 1998, when the relations between these two states became extremely tense making a ground for military clashes.<br> <a href="http://www.blog.co.uk/srv/media/media_item.php?item_ID=416602"><img src="http://data1.blog.de/media/602/416602_d401c6492d_s.jpg" align="" alt="201_turkey_siria_250x250" vspace="5" hspace="5"></a><br> The reason was the activation of PKK’s rebels. Ankara had facts that most of the PKK members used the Syrian banks in Turkey to finance their activity besides taking shelter and having military trainings in the territory of Syria. Moreover, PPK leader Abdulah Ojalan found shelter in Syria. Till 1987 Syria was refuting the fact that Ojalan was in their country or Syria anyhow supported PKK. However in July 1987, during the visit of Turkey’s Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, both countries signed a treaty committing them not to support any organization acting against the partner country. Anyhow Syria didn’t keep its promise together with the other ones given in August 1988, in April 1992, in November 1993, in April 1994.</p> <p>In this way Damascus wanted to oppose Ankara, the later has built a few dams on the rivers Tigris and Euphrates and controlled the water resources to Syria. Turkey was able either to reduce it to a minimum, as it has often threatened, or to flood Syria. According to the treaty signed during the above mentioned Ozal’s visit Turkey committed itself to give Syria 500 cubic meters of water a second, though the later clamed that for satisfying its irrigation requirements it needs 700 cubic meters. Thus Ankara uses water resources to exert pressure on Syria and in 1991, as a result of intergovernmental crisis caused by Kurds, water provision was reduced to 165 cubic meters. </p> <p>During Turkey’s National Security Council session in 1998 a decision was made to add proportionality of military units on the boarder with Syria as well as to make more precise the frontier territories’ minefields maps to cross them if necessary. </p> <p>However in the same year after a few attempts the parties at last succeeded to reach diplomatic agreement. PKK’s leader Abdulah Ojalan was deported from Syria. Ankara and Damascus signed the agreement of Adana according to which a few PKK military and training camps were closed and its active members’ bank accounts were blocked in Syria. This roused a positive response among Turkey’s public, political and business circles. A decision was made to clear of mines the frontier territories which spurred the development of frontier trade. The frontier population’s visa regime was eased. Ten thousands of relatives were separated by the border since1939 when France on the ground of the League of Nations mandate gave Syria’s Aleqsandret sanjac to Turkey where it was named the vilaet of Hatay. The water provided to Syria reached 900 cubic meters a second. </p> <p>After this gesture by Turkey Damascus stopped stressing up the territorial problem, which in all the Syrian official maps also included the vilaet of Hatay. Israel accepted this step of Syria with enthusiasm as it could save as a precedent for the Golan Heights. </p> <p>* * * </p> <p>There was an unprecedented development of intergovernmental relationships after the death of Syria’s president Hafez Asad. The son of the late, Bashar Asad, used the visit of Turkey’s president Ahmed Nejded Sezer to the burial for an attempt to regulate the relationships. </p> <p>Turkey’s and Syria’s authorities paid more then 55 official visits during the period 2000-2005. In 2004 commodity circulation reached up to $1 billion. </p> <p>The US army’s invasion to Iraq as well as the attaching of importance to the Kurds’ role in the Northern Iraq by the Washington were the main political reasons to improve Ankara-Damascus relations. Both Turkey and Syria were worried about the possibility of Kurdish independent stats. Both of the countries have thick population of Kurds (for about 14 million in Turkey and 4 million in Syria) the problems will only get worse if the Kurds get independence in Northern Iraq. </p> <p>At that period the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relationships also furthered Ankara-Damascus relations’ strengthening, as the later one considered Turkish-Israeli cooperation to be anti-Syrian. </p> <p>In January 2004 Syria’s president Bashar Asad became the first president to pay an official visit to Turkey after Syria’s independence. Turkish-Syrian relations were spurred into a new phase of mutual understanding. The presidents in both countries condemned the US intervention to Iraq as well as spoke in favor of Iraq’s territorial integrity, that’s to say against the Kurdish independent state.</p> <p>Turkish-American and Turkish-Israeli cool relations as well as the improvement in Turkish-Iranian relations made a ground for a new possible regional axis: Turkey-Iran-Syria. All the three are very much worried about Kurdish problem, Iraq’s territorial integrity as well as Israeli and the US support to the Kurds in Northern Iraq. </p> <p>In July 2004 Syria’s Prime Minister Muhamed Naji Otari paid an official visit to Ankara, and in December of the same year Turkey’s Prime Minister made a return visit to Damascus after 17 years of interruption. During this visit Recep Tayip Erdoghan signed an agreement with his colleague Muhamed Naji Otari on building a joint hydroelectric power station, besides Syria became the first Arabic country to sign an agreement on free trading zone with Turkey. </p> <p>Both parties made a joint declaration owing to the positive results of the visit: “Turkey is an open gate to Europe for Syria, and Syria is an open gate to Arabic world for Turkey”. </p> <p>In his interview given in January 2005 Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Gule pointed out that Ankara was ready to develop relations with Tehran and Damascus: “The development of these relations interests Turkey from economic, political and military standpoint, as they further security and stability in the region”. He also added that the interests from economic ties with Syria were so big that the other responses couldn’t make Turkey reconsider them. </p> <p>This was immediately followed by the visit of US military-diplomatic senior officials. The US made an attempt to review its cold relations with Turkey aiming to deter Ankara from making relations with Iran and Syria wormer. </p> <p>However, on the 13th of April 2005 Turkey’s President Ahmed Necded Sezer made an official visit to Syria. Washington frequently claimed Sezer to invalidate its return visit to Damascus aiming to keep up Syria’s isolation. Anyway Turkey stressed up its independence in foreign policy and didn’t yield to the Bush administration’s pressure. At the same time the delegation headed by Turkey’s deputy foreign minister Ali Tuygani left for the USA to make the situation better.</p> <p>* * * </p> <p>In Turkish-American relations the problem of Damascus has an important role. One of the subjects discussed during Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdoghan’s visit to Washington in June 2005 was the Syrian issue. </p> <p>During the press conference invited after the meeting with Bush, Erdoghan especially stressed up the role of Turkish “primary mission” in the Great Middle East project, among which was multy-party system creation in the regional countries (especially in Syria). In this way Erdoghan probably wanted to ease Washington’s criticism concerning to Ankara’s close relations with Damascus. </p> <p>The appeals directed to Syria continued in the interview given to “The New York Times”, where Turkey’s Prime Minister, apparently taking up the new role, clamed Syria to follow the example of Turkey. </p> <p>* * *</p> <p>Turkey’s vague European future prompts it not to ignore the alternative of claiming the role of the leader in the Middle East. The result of such a policy we can see in Turkey’s wormer relations with its neighbors and America’s willingness to include Ankara in its Great Middle East project. </p> <p>In the near future Turkey will try to keep worm relations with Syria aiming to reach cooperation in the framework of the Great Middle East project. </p> <p>As a leader state of this project Turkey will continue offering its mediation in Syria-Israeli conflict settlement process as well as will be a negotiator in Washington-Damascus dialogue. </p> <p>At the same time the unsolved water and territorial problems as well as possible external spurs can seriously hamper Turkish-Syrian relations’ development. </p> <p>June 2005 </p> <p> <small> <a href="http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/03/13/turkish_syrian_relationships~639590/#comments">Comments</a> </small> </p>http://sugartak.blog.co.uk/2006/03/13/turkish_syrian_relationships~639590/#comments